9) Tush (the breast).

10) Muyun (the neck).

11) Ichay karyn (the intestines) are given to children and women, who usually get nothing of the best pieces.

Seniority is not ranked by direct line, i. e., the brother of someone, older or younger, has precedence (ulkun yol) over the son of the same person. Uncles are met with greater honor than nephews. (1)

1. The Khan is succeeded by his brothers, then his sons, then the sons of the brothers.

Before old men (aksakals), i. e., elders, mullahs and influential persons, even of strange clans, they sit properly, do not contradict, and fulfill requests. It is customary to exact an apology and a fine for reviling them or scuffling with them.

If a low person should chance to sit between high ones, he can be ousted or allowed to remain, in view of whether he and his father are good persons or not.

If a high person unjustly abuses an inferior, then a bii may say [683] to him: "Look here. If you do that again, not he but you will be fined."

When a high person beats an inferior, he is not punished for three blows, inclusively. And if the inferior responds with a blow during one of the first three blows, then he must pay a fine. /11/ Envoys are not [648] abused and not killed, according to the proverb: il'chige ulum kharam, death is forbidden to an envoy.

Inferiors, for example, young women, do not walk in front of elders, but go around behind them. If they pass in front of them by necessity, walking or riding, they show them honor (tazim) by greeting them or by some other sign of respect. If a woman bars a road to men, they stop her and force her to ride across behind them (the Perovsk uyezd).

The Tiuri are greeted after the usual salaam by the additional word aldiiar. (1) Of proud Tiuri it is said: it is a bad Tiur who prides

1. Apparently instead of "alla iar", they say "May God be a protector."

himself on an aldiiar (aldiiarga mas bulgan yaman tiure).

To ride up to a person or to a tent at a gallop is considered blameworthy. Such a person is asked reproachfully: "What happened?

5: Levchine RQ2 H
648

[For information on international relations, s
pp. 23-163.]

Kazak RQ2

ee category 116,

[137 cont.]

175 Having spoken in passing of the ancient Kazaks' way of life to show their resemblances to those of today, let us return to what the Oriental writers teach us about them.

This people has been known in Asia for a very long time. As one of the branches of that very numerous race, the Turks, it is no less ancient than the Naimans or the Kirgiz, or any of the [136] Asiatic peoples of the same race. The Kazaks came under the domination of Chingis Khan, and after the death of the conqueror passed in appanage to his son Djuchi, but although they belonged to the Golden Horde, they kept their own khans. For this reason they were sometimes under the dominion of their own main chiefs, and sometimes were joined to the Chagatai horde, that of Almalyk, or that of Tashkent, which was later called the Mogul Ulus.

After the weakening of the powerful states of Djuchi and Chagatai, internal disputes arose within many of the descent lines [races] belonging to the sons and descendants of Chingis Khan, especially among the nomads. The Uzbeks, who had seized Maverannahr and Khorezm, became the most powerful. But not all the peoples contributing to the disorder came under their sway. Some of them joined the Crimean Tatars, others the Mogul uluses, still others the true Tatars, that is, those of Kazan, and finally some joined the Kazak horde. All this took place after the fall of the Golden Horde. Later, when the Uzbeks split up, many of their branches fused with the Kazak horde. In this manner two powerful states were formed at the beginning [138] of the 16th century, in the Kipchak and Chete steppes. The first of these states, the Mogul Ulus, was headed by Khan Dadam, while the second, ruled by Arslan, khan of the Kazaks, was so powerful that it could raise an army of 400,000 men. This is found in the writings of Sultan Baber, founder of the famous empire of the ● [648] Grand Mogul in India. He gave one of his nieces in marriage to Arslan Khan and was an eyewitness to his power.

175 631 727 In this period several branches or tribes of many of the peoples known in the history of the Orient, and which broke away from the Golden Horde, were united with the Kazaks, either voluntarily or by force. It was at this time that the Kipchaks,

[139 cont.]
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the beginning of the 16th century, and in the second place in the documents of the relations with the [140] Nogais preserved in Moscow in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. We find in the latter, under the year 1534, that an envoy of Tsar Ivan Groznoi (the Terrible) named Danila Gubin, then among the Nogais, reported the following: "And the Kazaks, sire, are
[121] said to be very strong; and it is said, sire, that they waged war against Teshken (Tashkent); and the son of the king of Teshken is said to have fought against them twice, and the Kazaks defeated them." Likewise Semen Maltsov, sent in 1569 by Tsar Ivan Groznoi among the Nogais, who lived between the Volga and the Yaik /Ural/ rivers, spoke of the attack which "the Kazak hordes of Tsar Aknazar, Tsarevitch Shigai, and Tsarevitch Chelim" (1) made upon their ulus. These accounts, which we

1. See Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, note 245.

include here only because of their antiquity, tell us nothing about the name of the Kirghiz-Kazaks.

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● 648
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Four years later, however, Ivan resolved to establish political relations with them, persuaded no doubt by the demand of the Stroganovs who had established commercial relations with the Kazak horde. This circumstance obliged the Tsar to protect them and reach out to them by sending a deputy to the chief of the horde. This mission was entrusted to /the Muscovite/ Tretiak /deputy?/ Chebukov (2). But he was taken prisoner near the Kama

2. Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 378.

River in 1573 by the famous Mametkul, nephew of Kuchum, the khan of Siberia, before he arrived at his destination. With the failure of this first attempt to open relations with the Kirghiz-Kazaks, Ivan put off a second attempt till a more favorable time. On May 30, 1774 /1574/, however, he gave the Stroganovs a letter patent, granting them permission to trade with the

[140 cont.]
175 Kirghiz-Kazaks without paying duty (3).
[648
439]

3. See Miller, History of Siberia /Opisanie Sibirskogo Tsarstva.../, p. 87, and Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 661.

The conquest of Siberia which took place not long after brought this people closer to the Russians.

[643] [141] Kuchum, the last khan of Siberia, was himself a Kirghiz-Kazak. When he had made himself master of Isker by force of arms and by putting to death the princes Yediger and [662] Bekbulat, who ruled there (1), it was indispensable that he have

1. See the Chronicles of Siberia; Fisher's History of Siberia /Sibirskaia Istoriia..., 1774/, introduction, article 84; Karamzin's history of the Russian empire, Vol. IX, p. 644.

around him an army made up of his former compatriots. Thus Yermak and the companions of his adventures undoubtedly fought against the real Kazaks, or Kirghiz-Kazaks.

[721 Murtaza, Kuchum's father, was probably quite a powerful
797] sovereign, for he not only gave his son a year to conquer the land, but also sent him additional mullahs to spread the Moslem religion in Siberia (2).

2. See Miller's History of Siberia and Fisher's History of Siberia, introduction, articles 86 and 87.

175 After Yermak, Kuchum, as we know, was driven out of
648 Isker by Seidak, who later fell into the hands of the Russians.
662 Uraz Mehmet, the tsarevitch or sultan of the Kazaks and nephew of Tevkel, who called himself khan of the Kazaks and

[141 cont.]
175 Kalmuks (3), was taken prisoner with Seidak.
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662

3. This is what it says in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 98, yet the bringing together of these two titles seems very extraordinary to us.

This event not only gave Tsar Fedor the power to revive his father's plans concerning the Kirghiz-Kazaks, but also the right to call himself their sovereign.

175 Tevkel, who wished to free his nephew, sent an ambassador
648 to Moscow in 1594 with a letter to the Tsar in which he begged
636 the latter to accept him with all his horde as subjects and to send him Uraz Mehmet (4).

4. See Kirghiz [i.e. Kazak] matters, 1794 and 1795, in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and the reference to them in Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, note 332.

Knowing the customs and habits of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, one can be certain that this proposition was no more than a [142] meaningless promise in order to free Uraz Mehmet, one which Tevkel had no intention of keeping whether his nephew were given up to him or not. This he evinced when the Tsar replied to him by letter in 1795 that he accepted him with all his horde as his subjects and that he was sending him firearms, but that as proof of his allegiance he required him to force the khan of Bukhara to make peace and to compel Kuchum to submit. He promised to set Uraz Mehmet (1) at liberty as soon as Tevkel presented one of

1. Godunov later named this prince tsar of Kasimov. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. IX, p. 22..

[142 cont.]
175 his sons, the Tsarevitch or Sultan Hussein, as hostage in his
648 place (2).
63

2. For this letter, see the packet [envoi] preserved in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This letter was conveyed by Tevkel's ambassador, who was accompanied by Veliamin-Stepanov, interpreter for the Tatar language.

What sort of news Stepanov may have brought to the Tsar upon his return from the horde is unknown. It is only known that his journey produced no political advantage for Russia, that neither Tevkel nor his successors were Russian subjects until the 18th century, and that they neither served Russia nor rendered her
[121] any kind of help. On the contrary, they attacked her new colonies in Siberia.

175 One must believe, however, that those who lived on the
648 frontiers of the new Russian territorial possessions must have had
439 frequent relations with them, as did our merchants, at that time, and that they acquired accurate knowledge about their country. For in the book Bolshoi Chertezh /The Great Description, which according to the well-founded evidence of Karamzin must have been written during the reign of Tsar Fedor Ivanovich (3) /1584-

3. Karamzin, op. cit., Vol. X, p. 259.

1598/, many dwelling places which existed on the lands of the Kazak horde are spoken of in great detail.

131 [143] As this book is rare, we believe it is not irrelevant to quote that which concerns the steppes of the Kirghiz-Kazaks:

"And from the Sea of Khvalymsk (Caspian) to the Blue Sea (Aral), toward the east of summer, it is 250 versts /266 km./.

"And along the Blue Sea to the mouth of the Syr /Darya River/ it is 280 versts /299 km./, and across, by the Blue Sea,

[146 cont.]

175 Ishim in 1635, and that Djangir, then the commander of the
721 Kirghiz-Kazak army, was taken prisoner. When he had regained his liberty by chance, he wished to avenge himself against the Dzungars, and tormented them constantly by his raids. In order to force peace over a long period, or if possible to completely exterminate such dangerous neighbors, Bagatyr assembled an army of 50,000 men, made up of an equal number of his own men and those of his allies.

175 At the head of his forces he easily subdued two descent
724 lines of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, 10,000 persons altogether. He would have continued to destroy all those whom Djangir set in opposition to him if this Kirghiz [-Kazak] sultan, a gifted warrior as one can see, had not used the most salutary measures in defending himself. He had only 600 armed men, and not daring
175 to attack the enemy openly with this handful of men, he placed
723 half of his group in a gorge between two mountains, causing them to be surrounded by a deep ditch and with a raised entrenchment. Then he himself lay in wait with the other half on the other side of the mountain. The Dzungars arrived in front of the entrenchment and attacked it. While they were losing many men in this struggle, in which they were at a disadvantage because of the narrow expanse of the terrain, Djangir fell upon them from the rear. This unexpected attack, the daring of the men he had chosen for this purpose, and the excellence of the guns with which they were all [147] armed, inflicted great losses upon Bagatyr. At this moment Alantush, the Tatar prince, arrived to support the Kirghiz [-Kazaks] at the head of 20,000 fresh troops and completed Bagatyr's ruin. The Dzungars were forced to withdraw and to limit their vengeance to taking away the prisoners they had taken during the battle. The Kazaks continued to harass them with frequent raids, not only during Bagatyr's time, but also under his successors.

175 We found the third reference to Ishim in the papers of
●648 Tevkelev, former interpreter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later major general. He spent two years among the

[147 cont.]
175 Kirghiz [-Kazak] hordes by order of Empress Anna, and induced
648 them to submit themselves to Russia. Later, as we shall see below, he was for a long time a member of the Orenburg Commission. In following government orders, he was in constant contact with the Kirghiz [-Kazak] khans and sultans. He knew their language thoroughly and kept a journal of the oral conferences he
[15] had with them. He says, in one of these journals, written in 1748, that Abulkhair, khan of the Little Horde, and Abul Mahmet, khan of the Middle Horde, and the most distinguished sultans had informed him of their genealogies.

We will place the three charts which we have composed at the end of this work.

175 The first chart shows us that Djadek, one of the two
643 founders of a line, was the father of Shigai Khan, whose son was Ishim, the same one whom, as we mentioned earlier, was khan
[21] of Turkestan when he waged war against the kungtaidji of the Dzungar and to whom Abulgazi Baiadur went to seek refuge.

It is easy to prove that this Ishim is not some other unknown Kazak khan, for Abul Mahmet, who gave Tevkelev this genealogy (1) and called himself the [148] great-grandson of

1. Abul Mahmet wrote the same thing about his origin to Prince Urusov, on July 19, 1740. See the archives of the Orenburg Border Commission. With two accounts as certain as this, we can assure our readers [148] that the Siberian Herald /Sibirskii Vestnik/ of 1820, on page 114 of the article on the Kazaks, is wrong in calling Abul Mahmet the son of Kuchiuk.

Ishim, was born at the end of the 17th century, as can be seen from many writings and other papers of this time. If we go back from this prince to his father, his grandfather, and so forth, we will find that Ishim in his youth and Djangir at a mature age

175 [150 cont.]
631 We could not find any information on Pulat, son of Khan
173 Tiavka and father of Abul Mahmet, who is found in the table.

175 The traditions say only that the calm re-established by
721 Tiavka did not last long among the Kazaks. Dissensions and troubles began again, and the neighboring peoples were quick to profit from them. On the west they were attacked by the Volga Kalmuks [Kalmyk], and on the north by the Bashkirs and the Cossacks of Siberia. But the most terrible of all were the Dzungars to the east. At this time their chief was the powerful Kungtaidji Galdan Tsyren, who not only made all the nomadic peoples tremble but also spread terror in Russia and China. In this unfortunate situation, the Kazaks could not expect help except from the power of Peter the Great, whose vast genius, concerned with the glory and welfare of his people, watched over the Asian border while he had the most important dealings in Europe.

176 Prince Gagarin was governor of Siberia at that time. The
● 648 Tsar commanded him not only to open relations with the Kazaks,
662 but to help them, if possible, against Galdan Tsyren, in order to put some check on the continual increase of power of the Dzungarian leader. Gagarin carried out the Tsar's commands in 1717, and the Kazak khans, Tiavka, Kaip, and Abulkhair (2)

2. We have drawn this information from works and translations /Sochineniia i Perevody, k Polze i Uveseleniiu Sluzhashchiia/ of January, 1760. See the article on the "golden saber" /Izvestie o pesotnom zolote v Bukharii... (On the Gold [43] Dust in Bukharo)/. The Khan Tiavka in question must be the famous legislator of the Kazaks of whom we have spoken. But at this time he was already very old. His weakness and the loss of power which ensued, were no doubt the cause of the election, while he still lived, of the khans Abulkhair and Kaip, whose names we see here for the first time (the year 1717).

[150 cont.]

175 replied by [151] promising to be obedient to Russia in all things.
649 These relations had no sequel, however, for Prince Gagarin was
[662] recalled to Moscow shortly after, and Tiavka, the oldest and most cautious of the khans, died. His companions did not know enough to profit from this favorable situation. Instead of joining together again to ask Russia's protection against the Dzungars, they
[578] began to quarrel among themselves, and without any thought of the general welfare they continued in their usual calling, that is, they pillaged all their neighbors. And Russia, who had offered them help and protection, was not the last to suffer from
[726] this. Not content with their frequent raids across the borders of Siberia, in that same year, 1717, they moved in as far as Novo-Sheshminsk (in the Kazan guberniya), took the city, and laid it waste, and although they were driven out with great losses, they
[727] took away a large number of prisoners. This last expedition was made by the subjects of Khan Abulkhair (1). Kaip was afraid

1. See Rychkov's History of Orenburg /Istoriia Orenburgskaia/ and governor
[643] Nepluev's reports to the senate. Rychkov does not say who commanded the Kazaks in this expedition, but Nepluev says that it was Khan Abulkhair, who later became a subject of the Russian empire.

that it might be attributed to him and that he might be punished, although innocent, for the crime of his rival, so he sent a letter
[728] in 1718 to Peter I, in which he offered perpetual peace and alliance (2).

2. This letter, as well as the reply made to it by the governor of Kazan, is still preserved today /1832/ in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

175 This letter, however, did not stop the just vengeance of
721 the dwellers along the border, who were annoyed by the constant
726

[153 cont.]
175
[166
726] latter, like that of the Volga Kalmuks, did not compare with the power of the Dzungars, nevertheless the lands which the Kazaks had seized belonged to them, and consequently they wished to [721] give no peace to the people who had taken the lands from them. Expeditions for revenge and constant raids were planned for the future and began from this moment. The Cossacks of the Ural, [148] new neighbors of the Kazaks, promised to do the same. It was necessary to seek a defender against so many enemies; it was necessary to ask help from Russia. Perhaps this thought had often come to the minds of the sultans and the wisest elders, but it was difficult not only to put it into execution, but also to propose it to the people. Although we find in the archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed account of the articles proposed orally in 1726 by Kaibakar, deputy of the Kazaks, who [154] came to ask the protection of Russia for the Little Horde, in the name of the elders Sugur, Iedikbai, Khadjibai, Tiak-Kulybai, and others, nevertheless this communication had no decisive sequel. Judging by the names of the elders who sent Kaibakar, one is forced to think that they were too weak and inconspicuous to win the people over to them, and their mission remained unsuccessful. It is not known what suddenly led them to take this step, but one can be sure that most of the Kazaks were displeased by it. They preferred their barbarous freedom to any kind of order [636 and to dependence upon laws, nor had they forgotten that the 181] tenets of their religion commanded them to regard the Russians as infidels.

[148 These two obstacles seemed to make the free union of the 636] Kazak hordes with a Christian empire impossible. But unfortunate circumstances, endless dissensions, bloodshed, and the clever mind of Khan Abulkhair changed the inclinations of the people to the point where, after a feeble resistance, he decided to carry out a measure, based on the individual views of a single man, to which he could not have been moved by love of the public weal. I speak here of the voluntary submission of the Kazaks to Empress Anna, an event which took place in 1730, as we shall see below.

[128 Before coming to the description of this revolution, which is so important, we should note here that it forms the line of

[183 cont.]

[648] we know that in 1736, in addition to the fortress of Orenburg, he had founded the forts of Guberlinsk and Ozernaya on the Yaik, which still exist today, and three fortified ports, Sredny, Berdskoy, and Krylov. We do not speak here of the forts erected on the Samara River and in the interior of the country of the Bashkirs since they have no connection with our subject.

The arrival of Russian troops at the Ural River could not help but influence the peace of the Kazak hordes, even if only momentarily. But this did not prevent them from harassing Russian subjects in the west.

Although Kirilov had not succeeded in seeing the Kazak princes and consequently could not carry out the order he had received to prepare their hordes to attack the Volga Kalmuks who were revolting, the Kazaks had no need of being urged to an act toward which they were naturally inclined.

Scarcely had they heard of the disturbances on the Volga, when they hastened off to pillage the Kalmuks (2). The successful

2. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of February 9, 1737, under the name of Kirilov, and the copies of reports of Prince Repnin and Beklemishev which are appended to it.

outcome of this campaign and the seizure of many prisoners and some livestock in 1736 was not enough to satisfy the greed of the Kazaks, and they repeated their attacks in 1737, returning home with considerable booty.

Kirilov was charged (3) with making Abulkhair realize how

3. See the ukase of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of March 8, 1737.

much the ravages which his subjects were inflicting upon those of the empire [184] were contrary to the views of the government, and ordered to take measures to prevent them from committing similar acts in the future. This admonishment did not achieve

5: Levchine--182 G-4, 5 (ca. 1821) 1840 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Plate 2

Chart I

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Genealogy of the First and Main Branch of the Kirghiz-Kazak Khans
(The earliest founders of the descent groups are two brothers)



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Note: The circles with double lines are for the khans and sultans who were still living in 1748, the time at which these charts were made up.

/143 cont./

101 175 After the death of Abulkhair in the third quarter of the 15th century, the customary struggle for power aomong the Genghisides grew stronger in his ulus. The nomads, who had always felt the animosity of their rulers, found it impossible to remain in the Uzbek Horde. Most of the Kypchak joined 619 the alliance of the Kirghiz-Kazak, increasing its number to 175 200,000. Under Kasym-khan (who died in the first quarter 643 of the 16th century), the son of Djanybek, the alliance of the 648 Kirghiz-Kazak, which added to itself /144/ the nomadic

764 614

A Kirghiz /Kazak/ cemetery of the Adoev /or Aday/ clan in Kara-Chungul.

175 643 648 619 peoples of the eastern half of the Chagatay ulus, numbered over a million persons. Kasym-khan, who united all the Kirghiz /Kazak/ people, had enormous military power at his disposal. Fortunately for his subjects, this last of the mighty khans was not numbered among the usual conquerors of Asia, and he acquired the love of his people by a policy of peace. When averting a proposal to make war, Kasym-khan said that "the Kazak, as a nomadic 175 643 people, should think about winter camps and not about war." Kasym-kahn enjoyed unusual popularity among the people for his love of peace. After the death of Kasym-khan, the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance

175 643 631 /144 cont./ After the death of Kasym-khan, the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance broke up into smaller units. Each of its sultans tried to seize power, and the dissensions among them led to the ruin of the Kirghiz-Kazak alliance. Later, 200 years after the death of 175 619 631 Kasym-khan, the unifier of the Kirghiz-Kazak, his people again appeared on the scene of history in the form of three political unions, known by the names of Elder, Middle, and Younger Hordes. (1).

[101] 1. We consider it necessary to note that that the current names of the hordes as Great and Little characterize the hordes wholly incorrectly and also render the sense of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ words unfaithfully. Uly means elder, ancient, and not great in the sense of quantity (especially as this horde is smaller in number than the others). Kshi does not mean little (in sense of quantity), but younger.

• 648 175 619 63 614 [101] In the first quarter of the 18th century "there arose the designations of: the southeastern Kazak clans of the Dulat and Kangly as the Elder (uly) Horde, being the most ancient Turkic tribes occupying the lands of the Kazak alliance; the Kypchak, Argyn, Naiman, and Kerei as the Middle (orta) Horde, being the later comers; and the tribe of the Alchin and the clans separated from the tribes of the horde as the Younger (kshi) Horde" (Aristov). At this time all three hordes, who had been pushed from their southeastern lands by the Kalmyk, were wandering in the basins of the Ishim, Nura, and Sary-Su rivers. In 1723 the Dzungarian ruler, Galdan-Tsyren, conquered the clans of the Elder and Middle Hordes. The invasion by the Dzungarians and the Kalmyk forced the Kirghiz /Kazak/ hordes to move west to the Aral and Caspian seas and north to the upper courses of the Ishim, Ural and Tobol rivers. The Younger and Middle

175 /144 cont./ The Younger and Middle
648 Hordes, pushed by their enemies from the south to the so-
619 called Gor'kaya line, were obliged to recognize Russian sov-
631 ereignty. The relations of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ to their sultans and khans were free. They recognized their authority as long as their interests coincided with the views of the autonomously
175 ruling clans. In 1730, Sultan Abulkhair of the Younger Horde
643 asked the Russian government to accept his people as subjects.
648 He did this partly because he feared an invasion of his lands
619 by Galdan-Tsyren, and partly with the intention of strengthen-
614 ing his power, which was tottering because of the enmity be-
631 tween the sultans. In the 18th century the sultans Ablai /or Ablay/, AbulMambet and Barak of the Elder and Middle hordes became the rulers of the people by utilizing their good will. Ablai, the most populat of the khans named by the Kirghiz /Kazak/, carefully avoided subjecting the Kirghiz /Kazak/ to a foreign power. Some of the clans of the Middle Horde accepted Russian sovereignty under the son of khan Ablai in 1782, and under Bukei /or Bukey/ Khan, the sons of Barak, at the end of the 18th century. Certain clans of the Elder Horde accepted Russian sovereignty in the 19th century in the person of their sultan Syuk-Ablaikhanov. Later, by the third quarter of this century all the Kirghiz /Kazak/ clans had gradually recognized Russian rule except the Naiman and Kerei. /145/ These, after the annihilation of the Dzunguarian kingdom by the Chinese in the third quarter of the 18th century left the present Akmolinsk oblast to go to their old lands on the Tarbagatai and Black Irtysh, and from there into China.

175 The Kirghiz /Kazak/, who had never known a sovereign
648 power, which would have been unfeasible in the free steppe, where from time immemorial the traditional form of power had been concentrated in the hands of an autonomously ruling clan and its leaders, became part of the population of the steppe oblasts in the 19th century. Although they had acknowledged their dependence on the Russian government, the Kirghiz /Kazak/ did not reconcile themselves to this position at once, and even attempted to reestablish their independence later.

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kalmyk AH5

K
175 /145 cont./
648 but these attempts were unsuccessful.

K
175 In the 1840's the Kirghiz /Kazak/ steppe recalled the
648 past for the last time. Kenesary-Kasimov, grandson of Ablai
669 Khan, eclipsing the glory of his highly popular grandfather in the folk legends, assembled several thousand horsemen from the ranks of the malcontents. /illustration appears here/ proclaimed himself the restorer of the former greatness of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ people, and attempted to arouse all the Kirghiz /Kazak/ people under his banner. An enormous block of the nomadic population remained indifferent to the appeal of Kenesary, however. Yet the bravery and audacity shown by his brother Naurzbai /or Naurzbay/ and the latter's comrades won the sympathy of the population, who constantly protected the people of Kenesary and saved them from the pursuing Russian detachments, even though they did not express their sympathies actively. Thanks to this, Kenesary held sway over the Kirghiz steppe for seven years, and his followers traversed all the area from Orenburg to Karkaraly /Karkaralinsk/ and from Petropavlovsk to Turkestan, destroying Kirghiz /Kazak/ nomad villages and Russian settlements and taking the people
K
[533] prisoner. In 1847 Kenesary and Naurzbai were killed by the Kirghiz /Kazak/, and now all that remains of their unusual audacity and bravery is a song in the memory of the people.

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175 With this we will end the description of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ for the time being and return to the chronological order of historical events in the life of the region.

K.K. /146/ In the 16th century, as we have seen, a people
175 who were known to the Russians under the name of Kalmyk
101 appeared in the southern sector of the region, and they drove
648 the Kirghiz/Kazak/ to the northwest. The Kalmyk represented
619 an alliance, called Oirot, composed of several tribes (the Torgout, Khonz, Khoshout, and Dzungarians). In the beginning
KK of the 17th century internal rivalries and the struggle with the
175 eastern Mongols split up the alliance and it fell apart. In 1628
619 the Torgout went west to the upper courses of the Tobol and Ural
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RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kalmyk AH5

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Dzungarians however, would not permit the Russians to establish themselves there. In spite of the fact that Buchholz was accompanied by a considerable detachment (3,000 men), they besieged him and forced him to retreat with great losses to the mouth of the Om and to renounce his aim. Only five years later, with the consent of the Dzungarians, the Russians did succeed in founding several fortresses along the Irtysh (Omsk, Staro-Semipalatinsk, and Ust-Kamenogorsk).

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As we have seen, in 1723 the Dzungarians defeated a part of the Elder and Middle Hordes of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ (wandering west of them). The Younger Horde and the part of the Middle Horde that remained independent moved northwest to the Siberian border of the Russians and to the Bashkir. Meanwhile the khans Abulkhair and Semeke swore allegiance to the Russians in order to protect themselves better from the Dzungarians.

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It was during this period that the kingdom of Dzungaria reached its greatest power and might, extending from the Altai across the southern part of the present Semipalatinsk, Akmolinsk, and Turgai oblasts to the Aral Sea, and southward to the foothills of the Tien Shan. In 1739 the Dzungarians attacked the Kirghiz /Kazak/ and drove them to the Ural (Yaik) River, in the course of which many Bashkir who were subject to the Russians were killed. The Russian government, however, decided not to punish the Dzungarians for the attack, for it still recognized them as a powerful enemy. These Dzungarian kontayshi considered themselves so powerful that they paid no heed to good relations with their strong neighbors -- China and Russia. Only after /147/ clan dissensions once again arose in Dzungaria did its power fall, this time finally, and the Chinese and Russians did not fail to take advantage of it. In 1751 the kontaysha Amursana was seeking to rule Dzungaria. Since he had no hope of achieving his aim by his own power, he turned to the Chinese government for help. The latter, expecting to gain an advantage from the war which was beginning, sent an army to Amursana, which did indeed help him to gain rule. Instead of acknowledging

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Prehistoric Kalmyk AH5 Turkestan RL3

KK 175 631 648 /147 cont./ himself as dependent upon China after that, however, Amursana took advantage of the trust of the Chinese and attacked them suddenly and laid waste the nearest provinces (Hami). The indignant emperor declared war without quarter against the Dzungarians. Chinese armies entered Dzungaria several times, only to be met with defeat. In fact Amursana was finally beaten only in 1756, when he fled to Siberia to the Russians. The Chinese went through all of Dzungaria "with fire and sword" destroying almost the entire population without quarter (up to one million persons), paying no attention to sex or age. This was no conquest, but the extermination of a nation, individual by individual. And in truth, from this time on the Dzungarian kingdom completely disappeared from the scene of history. Only a few thousand people of the western Oliut /or Olyut/ tribes escaped, managing to flee to the Kalmyk hordes on the Volga.

KK [167]

With the destruction of the Dzungarian empire, in the southern strip of the present Kirghiz krai, there remained the Kirghiz-Kazak (the Elder, Middle, and Younger hordes), some of whom recognized Russian authority and some of whom went over to the Chinese. By the beginning of the 19th century, as we have seen, most of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ recognized the authority of the Russians and remained to wander in the southern part of our region (where they are still wandering to this day).

K 175 648 [619] [167]

Such, in brief, is the political history of the nomadic peoples of the Kirghiz krai.

P.T. 172 Clearly the Kirghiz krai has not ceased to be the arena of important historic events from the most ancient times to the end of the 19th century. Primitive tribes appeared here and passed through the first stages of their cultural development (the stone and copper stages). Dozens of peoples of Central, Inner, and Eastern Asia moved through here, for which reason the southern plains of the region are even known as the "historical gates of peoples." The various monuments found here in the region are mute evidence of the events which have taken place here in various epochs. We have already seen the

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Historical Turkestan RL2

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175 modern Akmolinsk, Bayan-Aul, Kokchetav, and Karkaralinsk.
648 In addition to the Kazak /Cossacks/, Russian industrial people
[167] came to the steppe and opened gold, silver, and copper mines
H.T there. In 1837 patrols were established between Kokchetav and
K Akmolinsk, and in the same year the government raised the
175 question of transferring the southern boundaries to the river Chu,
648 but were restrained from this step by the danger of increasing the fermentation among the Kirghiz /Kazak/, which had been evoked by the rebellion of Kenesary (1). When peace had been

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1. From 1847 to 1856, Little Russian /Ukrainian/ Kazak /Cossacks/ and peasants of the Orenburg and Samara guberniyas were resettled in the Kokchetav and Petropavlovsk uyezds, constituting over 8,000 persons. Meanwhile all the peasant villages along the Gor'kaya line and along the Irtysh (up to 14,000 persons) were made Kazak /Cossacks/ and attached to the land.

established, the Russian government at last held in its power the Kirghiz /Kazak/ hordes who wandered on the boundaries of the modern Akmolinsk oblast and the western part of the
H.T. Semipalatinsk oblast. Meanwhile further Russian conquests had
175 been going on in Semirechye. Finally in 1860 the Peking peace
648 treaty was made with China, according to which the Russian
439 /153/ border ran south from the Narym valley to Lake Zaisan (the Chakil'mes mountain) and across Tarbagatai to the Tien Shan. This increase in territory was already called for by trade considerations. By this time the Russian merchants had made millions of exchanges with the Chinese and the Mongols, buying tea and raw materials from them and selling manufactured goods.

The commercial dealings took place through the Zaisan

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Historical Turkestan RL2
Bashkir RF3

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All the uprisings, however, ended in the defeat of the Bashkir and the strengthening of Russian rule. In 1731-32, the Middle and Younger Kirghiz /Kazak/ hordes wandered to the border of Bashkiria and submitted to Russian sovereignty. This made it necessary to strengthen the position of Russian rule on the border, in part to defend the Kirghiz /Kazak/ from the Dzungarians, in part to support peaceful relations between the Bashkir and the Kirghiz /Kazak/. The latter, however, was not successful. /155/ There was frequent commotion, contributed to on the one hand by Moslem propaganda, pretenders, and fugitives confusing the population, and, on the other hand, by the provocative form of activity of agents of the Russian government. When the Russian administration gave away the Bashkir land along the Ilek to the nomad Kirghiz /Kazak/, a great uprising resulted (1735-40), which ended in a terrible massacre of the Bashkir.

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Neplyuyev, one of the first commanders of this border, rendered great service to his government in stabilizing the rule. He founded modern Orenburg and extended out from it three lines of fortifications which cut across the region and had a restraining effect on the population. One of these lines, the Nizhne-Yaitskaya Distantsiya /Lower Yaik Range/, extended along the right bank of the Ural (Yaik) to the Caspian Sea. Here nine fortresses were set up, and 19 outposts, whose defense was the responsibility of the Yaik Kazak /Cossacks/. In order to increase the Russian population, Neplyuyev arranged that the nameless fugitives might be permitted to settle freely around the advance posts and other parts of the region. The importance of this group of fugitives became especially marked after the administrative colonization (with Russians and Tatars) failed to lead to positive results. In order to attach the Kazak /Cossacks/ (fugitives) to these places, wages were established for all the service men and the right to exclusive use of the abundance of fish in the Ural River. As a consequence service people joined them from the Kama settlements, as well as part of the garrison population from the Orenburg army. These people constituted the first legal Russian population on the Ural border.

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Historical Turkestan RL2

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legal Russian population on the Ural border.

We shall now proceed to the peasant colonization of the Kirghiz krai.

For a long time the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts were officially closed to immigration. Life had already had its own way, however, several years before the question of the possibility of colonizing the steppe with an agricultural element, and the determination to do so, arose. Thus, in 1866 peasant settlements took form in the Akmolinsk oblast, and part of the immigrants, who either appeared accidentally in the region or at the invitation of Kazak /Cossack/ relatives, settled around Kazak /Cossack/ stations from the end of the 1870's and established themselves arbitrarily up to the middle of the 1880's, renting land from the Kirghiz /Kazak/.

The members of this arbitrary colonization of the region were mostly either urban people from various Siberian towns or peasants especially from the Tobol guberniya, from the Kurgan and Ishim uyezds, which were contiguous to the Akmolinsk oblast. These uyezds were already so densely populated that a certain amount, to be sure very relative, of crowding began to be felt, with the overly extensive (semi-rapacious) use of land which had come into practice. This migration took place systematically and, to a certain extent, rationally. Usually those who wished to move to the Akmolinsk oblast sent ahead scouts who looked over the suitable places, rented small sectors from the Kirghiz /Kazak/ (for half price or a small payment), cleared land, and planted, and, when they were convinced of the good quality (or rather of the untouchedness, the virginity) of the soil and the woods, they contracted for the land with legal papers for certain periods of time. The new settlers, when they were convinced of the high quality of their sectors of land, began to send their countrymen energetic invitations to come out to them, or else to accept /156/ wandering Russian immigrants. Thus Russian settlements with several dozen houses and all the necessary village installations arose in the midst of the Kirghiz steppes. In the course of time

RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Historical Turkestan RL2

H.T 167 175 648 241 427 K 427 648 175 /156 cont./ In the course of time and with the increase in population, misunderstandings arose between the Kirghiz /Kazak/ landlords and the immigrant renters (who sometimes went too far in exploiting their ignorant landlords), and this ended with the interference of the administration. When this happened the peasants usually petitioned for the formation of a Russian settlement on the land occupied by them. There were 317 of these families in the oblast when the first official decision was made (in 1879) for the organization of the Russian population in the region.

The first colonization of other localities on the Kirghiz Steppe -- in the Turgai oblast and the Pavlodar uyezd of the Semipalatinsk oblast -- also was possible and later took place on the basis of rental agreements. The natural and necessary transition from the rental use of the Kirghiz sectors to the use of their own landed property, however, always took place with difficulty, providing the Russian settlers of the steppe with every possible kind of trial and privation (in the Pavlodar uyezd it has not yet ceased).

H.T. 175 167 648 241 K 175 648 199 [241] The condition of the Russian colonization of the Kirghiz krai in the 1870's was described thus in the most devoted report for 1875 by General Kaznakov, one of the most outstanding Governor Generals of Western Siberia.

"The situation in the steppe oblasts," we read in this report, "demands special attention. Since the time the Kirghiz /Kazak/ accepted Russian sovereignty, their progress in becoming civilized has been nil. The attempts to change to agriculture have been virtually only those introduced by the Chinese government. Meanwhile, as long as the Kirghiz /Kazak/ follow the huge orbits of their nomadic rounds alone in the desert expanses of the steppes far from the Russian population, they will remain loyal subjects only in name and will count themselves as Russians only in the census. The Kazak /Cossacks/ who are adjacent to them along the line do not help the situation, being few in number, and they have even, one by one, learned the Kirghiz /Kazak/ dialect and adopted some of the customs, harmless ones, by the way, of the nomadic people."

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populations. -- The size and growth of the cities. -- The density and large numbers of people in the Russian and Kirghiz /Kazak/ settlements. -- The distribution of the population by sex, class, and religion. -- The ethnographic make-up of the population. -- General remarks on the "Sibiriak," Belorussians, Little Russians /Ukrainians/, and other nationalities in the region. -- The Siberian Kazak /Cossacks/. -- The Ural Kazak /Cossacks/. -- The peasants. -- The Kirghiz /Kazak/.

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The Kirghiz krai occupies a total area of 1,606,687 versts, which is equal to one-third of all of European Russia (including Finland, Poland, and the Caucasus), or one-third of all of Western Europe, while the area of each of its oblasts is equal to the area of the principal states of Europe.

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Administratively, the Kirghiz krai comprises four military oblasts: the Akmolinsk, Semipalatinsk, Ural, and Turgai oblasts. These oblasts were established in 1868 from the lands of the Siberian and Orenburg Kirghiz /Kazak/ and the lands of the Siberian and Ural Kazak /Cossack/ armies for greater convenience in administering the Kirghiz /Kazak and the Kazak /Cossack/ armies, and at the same time great changes were made. The "Statute on the Siberian Kirghiz /Ustav o Sibirskikh Kirgizakh/," which had determined the life of this borderland until then, was abolished, and a new "Temporary Code for the Administration of the Steppe Oblasts /Vremennoe Polozhenie ob Upravlenii v Stepnykh Oblastiakh/" was introduced (now somewhat changed). By this code the Kirghiz /Kazak/ lands were recognized as state property and put at the disposal of the Kirghiz /Kazak/ only for communal use, while considerable changes were introduced in the administration. The power of the sultan was abolished, as well as the orders from the districts. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ were allowed an administration of their nationality (elected from

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Historical Turkestan RL2

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their midst). The yassak tribute /per capita fur tribute/ was changed to a collection from each kibitka and various other reforms were introduced.

/176/ The military and civil administration was entrusted to the military governors of the oblasts from this time on. In addition to this, the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts, together with neighboring Semirechye, formed (in 1882) the Steppe Governor-Generalcy. The small administrative divisions for both the Kirghiz /Kazak/ and the Russian population are the uyezds.

The Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts are divided into five uyezds each, and the Ural and Turgai oblasts have four uyezds each, so there are 18 uyezds in the entire region. In addition, the Kirghiz /Kazak/ and the Russian population are broken up into volosts. There are 55 volosts in the Akmolinsk oblast, 84 in the Semipalatinsk oblast, 60 in the Ural oblast, and 54 (?) in the Turgai oblast. The volosts are subdivided in turn into nomad villages /aul/, and these are divided into kibitkas (yurts). Elected Kirghiz /Kazak/ -- the volost elders -- head the volosts, and they are directly subordinate to the uyezd chief. In addition, the Siberian Kazak /Cossack/ army is an independent administrative establishment within the Akmolinsk and Semipalatinsk oblasts, as is the Ural Kazak /Cossack/ army in the Ural oblast.

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The Siberian Kazak /Cossack/ army was founded by the first military colonists of the region -- the "serf Kazak /Cossack/," including various kinds of military men -- policemen, Don Kazak /Cossacks/, Ural Kazak /Cossacks/, Bashkir, Tatars, Little Russians /Ukrainians/, etc. The well-known Kasak /Cossack/ writer Usov has characterized the Siberian army in these words: "It was not the independent product of the land colonization of the borderlands, like the Don and Yaik Kazak /Cossack/ armies, but came forth fully armed from the hands of the administration and was completely indebted to the government for its existence. This feature has made an impression on all its later history. Throughout its existence, the government, without the

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692 peasant chief). The latter settle cases for all sums, but a final decision can be made in cases involving a sum no higher than 500 rubles.

[648] [175] Attempts by the Russian government (in 1830 and the 1850's) to reform the people's court ended in failure and made its position so much worse that the reform of 1868, which returned to the old electoral basis of the courts, could not restore the necessary respect to the court. The present biy is a candidate of a certain party, acting in its interests. The court of the biy is held publicly, and a great role is played by the oath of the witnesses or guarantors of the litigants. In addition to the court of the biy there is a domestic court (a survival of the patriarchate) of chosen kinsmen or of one "aksakal." These men conduct the affairs of the clan and are not subject to the control of the biy. Finally there is a court of arbitration which is usually turned to before the people's court.

628 Here one should mention the baranta -- the restoration of violated rights by force or by "one's own judgment." It consists of driving away the livestock of an offender. The best riders of a village take part in a baranta, and much courage and cleverness are necessary to seize horses from the village of the offender. The village that suffers in turn undertakes an attack by way of revenge on the village of the attackers. It can happen that whole volosts take part in a baranta (1).

[648] 1. The immigrants to the Akmolinsk oblast had to cope with baranta in the very first days of their life in the new land. The Kirghiz /Kazak/ not only took the horses from the fields, but also pulled the stables down. In this way the Kirghiz /Kazak/ avenged the restriction of their land which was taking place.

614 622 The patriarchal relationships within the clan and the family are also maintained. The aksakal (the chief of the clan)

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BRIEF

The Kazakhs, one of the major Turkic peoples in the USSR, live in a strategic area in the heart of Soviet Central Asia. There are evidences of deep and continuing conflict between their way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Soviet Communists. This study was intended to describe those sources of conflict and to indicate their implications for psychological warfare. A secondary objective of the study was to determine how well the vulnerabilities of a people inaccessible to direct methods of research can be assessed.

The traditional Kazakh way of life is pastoral nomadism; they abhor the settled farming life. Their customs and values reflect this independent heritage, and the Soviet drive during the 1930's to collectivize the nomads met with resistance. Between 1926 and 1939, the Kazakhs suffered a net population loss of almost one million--nearly one-fourth of their number in 1926. This loss was the result of starvation and disease, mass arrests and liquidations, flight across the border, and migration to neighboring Turkic peoples and to the urban and industrial areas of Siberia, all factors indirectly attributable to the imposition of Soviet control.

The organization of Kazakh society according to kin groups has been an important factor in contact with the Soviets. It has eased Kazakh transition to collective life, since most collective farms comprise single groups of blood relatives, but at the same time the closeness of the family ties has frequently led to the charge of nepotism by the Soviets.

The nativistic revival of Kazakh interest in their traditional heroes and customs was encouraged by the Soviets as a wartime morale measure. This revival--at once political, religious, and cultural in nature--became so strong that the Soviets considered it a threat and have attempted to suppress it. The importance of blood ties to the Kazakhs heightened their resentment of Soviet condemnation of their national heroes, whom they regard also as their ancestors. The Kazakhs' veneration of their past history and culture is fostered by their native religion, a blend of ancestor worship and shamanism. This folk religion is not formally organized. Administratively, the Soviets treat the Kazakhs as Moslems, although it is difficult to say how much Islam has influenced the rural Kazakhs.

The Kazakhs appear to be making only a minimal contribution to important republic activities which the Soviets are trying to encourage--industry and transport, Party and government. One explanation may be that the Kazakhs are not given equal opportunities; there is some evidence that the Slavs regard them as inferiors. Another reason is that the Kazakhs are not coming forward for training and advancement. Apparently they prefer to keep apart from the Slavic population of the republic; this conclusion is supported by the low rate of intermarriage between the two peoples. The Kazakhs appear to be opposed to many aspects of Sovietization, but at present their resistance is largely passive.

The local press proved to be a most useful source of information in the present study. The reports of local reactions and activities in relation to the official Party line provided many indications of strengths and weaknesses, trouble spots and failures. In addition to this source, research methods from many disciplines were combined to utilize all available data and information.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

INTRODUCTION[1]

Kazakhstan, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, extends from the Caspian Sea to the Sino-Soviet frontier of Sinkiang, including within its borders an environment ranging from arid deserts to fertile mountain valleys. It covers an area of more than one million square miles—about four times that of Texas. It is the second largest unit in the Soviet Union, immediately following the Russian republic.

Size is not the only impressive feature of Kazakhstan. Budgetwise the republic ranks third among the 16 republics of the USSR, after Russia and Ukraine, and ahead of several considerably more populous administrative units. Its importance for Soviet production was enhanced by the industrial developments of World War II. The mining and industrial concentrations of Karaganda and of the eastern part of Kazakhstan lie about midway between the western boundaries of the Soviet satellite empire and the Siberian shores of the Pacific. Postwar planning clearly reflects the Soviet estimate of the potentialities of the area's natural resources in the effort to create in Central Asia a "freedom-loving peoples' arsenal for peace."

The Soviet Central Asian basin is separated from the non-Soviet world by high mountain chains and deserts. The Turkic peoples of the USSR, who number about 15 million and thus form the largest non-Slavic minority in the Soviet Union, have lived in and traveled about this area for centuries. The Kazakhs and the other Turkic groups share many similarities in language and in culture. They also experience in common a conflict between their traditional way of life and the policies imposed upon them by the Central Communist regime, a conflict as acute as that experienced by any of the other minority peoples.

The present study of the Kazakh way of life was undertaken in an endeavor to determine the nature and source of these conflicts, and to examine the problems created thereby for Moscow. In addition, the report sets forth information gathered concerning the communication patterns and facilities of the republic insofar as these are relevant to the possible needs of psychological warfare.

This section summarizes those aspects of the deep-seated differences between the Soviet and native Kazakh cultures which can most

[1]Part I was written by Thomas Gladwin, Human Resources Research Office, and Lawrence Krader, Bureau of Social Science Research.

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121 reasonably be expected to persist over time and which indicate probable vulnerabilities to psychological warfare.

COMMUNICATIONS

Because psychological warfare depends ultimately upon the ability to communicate, the existing patterns and facilities for communication have been given considerable attention in the report. These data are concerned not only with radio communications, literacy rates, and similar factors of importance in communicating from a distance, but also with motion pictures and book publishing, which are important during consolidation operations. Such scanty data as are available are given on the distribution of ethnic groups in the republic as a whole and within cities, a matter of importance in helping to define the limits of informal or word-of-mouth communication. Even more scanty, but highly important, are the few available indications of the direction and amount of uncontrolled flow of Turkic peoples back and forth between the USSR and Afghanistan, Iran, and other countries.

COLLECTIVIZATION

181 221 Among the many characteristics of Kazakh culture which have stood in the way of successful adaptation to Soviet policy, their centuries-old dedication to a life of pastoral nomadism has consistently created the most acute problems—problems which became disastrous for the Kazakhs during the collectivization drive of the 1930's. For generations [823] the Kazakhs had led their flocks of sheep and goats in a yearly round between winter and summer grazing areas, traveling in bands whose [621] members were united by bonds of kinship and led by the senior men. Like so many nomads they were proud of their way of life and viewed agriculture and the sedentary life it implies as both unmanly and degrading. The small amount of farming which was occasionally done was [462] performed by women, who have always occupied a subordinate position in [564] Kazakh society, and by slaves and the poor. [567]

The determination of the Soviet regime to settle the Kazakhs, along with the other peoples of the USSR, on collective farms met with resist- C48 ance and cost hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs their livelihood and 197 their lives. The net loss in Kazakh population in the period 1926-1939 amounted to almost one million; if one takes into account the normal [161] increase otherwise to be expected during this time (based on figures for the USSR as a whole) the figure is closer to one and a half million.

Some compromises were made during the later phases of collectivization, but the basic conflict remains and manifests itself in a number of different ways. The Kazakhs are among those affected by a plan for massive cultural change which the Soviets believe will eventually create a society uniformly organized in accordance with "socialist reality." Thus far, however, cultural change in Kazakhstan has failed in many ways to proceed according to plan.

"FAMILY RELATIONS"

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The organization of Kazakh society by kin groups, bound together by strong ties of blood relationship into disciplined and cooperative units, has both interfered with Soviet planning and increased the extent of Kazakh suffering. The resistance of one person involves all his relatives in the ensuing punishment. At the same time these large family groupings do not fit into the Soviet conception of social and economic organization. The Soviets have, in fact, an explicit policy against "family relations." This phrase has two meanings, one literal, the other figurative. Literally it means nepotism, the use of his position by a man in power to obtain a good post for a relative. Figuratively, it denotes personal relationships on the job, relationships which the Soviet regime feels may permit one person to cover up the failings of another, and which may even become conspiratorial.

KN K01

In Kazakh society all action and decision take place within the framework of very literal "family relations," and this pattern inevitably is carried over into Soviet-sponsored activities. The bulk of the membership of a collective farm in Kazakhstan today is likely to comprise a single group of blood relatives, its leaders the older men of the group. This is particularly true of those areas in which herding remains important. The retention of kin group solidarity, where it has been permitted, has had two important effects. It has eased the adjustment of the Kazakhs to collectivization, while at the same time making possible maximum cooperation between collective farm members in covering up violations of Soviet directives and policy.

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The problem becomes even more acute when Kazakhs are drawn into industry and into the Party and government. They naturally try to surround themselves with their relatives. Paradoxically, Soviet policy has often tended to foster this tendency; political affiliation, like everything else among the Kazakhs, tends to be a family matter, and a willingness to cooperate with the Communists is confined to certain—usually a very few—families in a given locality. Yet, political (Communist) reliability is necessary for admission into governmental, Party, and technical fields. Hence if Kazakhs are to be utilized at all in these activities, the chances are good that many of them will be related, whether through deliberate nepotism or not. And with this go all the hazards the Soviets see in "family relations."

SOVIET ADMINISTRATION

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In general, the Kazakhs participate only to a restricted degree in higher-level activities, particularly those which the Soviets feel are vital for the building and consolidating of the USSR—industry, transport, the Party, and government. There appear to be two reasons for this. The first is that the Slavs do not extend to the Kazakhs equal opportunity for training and advancement. Experiences reported by Turkic soldiers captured from mixed units in World War II suggest that they are generally looked upon as inferiors. Furthermore, in a society in which political

K 648 reliability is essential for advancement, the Slavs are understandably hesitant to place the Kazakhs in positions of responsibility and trust, whether this involves "family relations" or not. The second reason is that the Kazakhs simply are not coming forward to be trained and promoted. This is seen especially in the virtual absence of Kazakh women in positions of any responsibility. Here Kazakh and Communist values are completely opposite. In theory, if not in practice, Soviet women are considered the equals of men, whereas the Kazakhs, in both theory and actuality, keep their women in a very subordinate status. But it is also apparent that the men themselves are not becoming any more involved than they have to in the activities most emphasized by the Soviets, and where they can they are holding onto their old values and traditional way of life, meeting the Soviet demands with essentially passive resistance.

K [560] [187] K [154]

It must be presumed that Kazakh participation in Soviet affairs will increase over time under the continuing pressure exerted. Nevertheless, the Sovietization of the Kazakhs remains sufficiently unsatisfactory, after nearly 40 years of effort expended in this direction, to provide assurance that the process is far from complete.

K [177] KN 665

The nonparticipation of Kazakhs in Soviet developments presents a serious dilemma not only for the regime as a whole but also for the local Communist Party. The primary function of the Party in the Soviet system is to inspire or coerce the people to ever greater efforts toward the goals specified by the regime. Although the Party "carries a big stick," and is supported in this by the entire apparatus of the State, including the secret police, it is obvious that coercion alone is not sufficient to maintain a consistently high rate of output in the daily activities of any people. For this reason the Party uses the carrot as well as the stick, and the various devices used to stimulate production and increase enthusiasm for Soviet objectives are, with the majority of USSR citizens, quite effective. Whatever their real feelings toward the regime and its policies, these citizens see no alternative to living within the framework of Soviet society and making their way in accordance with its standards.

KN 665 563 K [154]

The Kazakhs, on the other hand, feel they do have an alternative—their old way of life and its deeply entrenched values, which are still very much alive. This is not the road to riches, but few of them have ever had reason to hope for riches. As a result the Kazakhs generally put forth only the minimum necessary effort. Not only do they have little interest in industry and transport, but their output is consistently below expectations in agriculture and even in herding, their traditional occupation.

Thus the Party, under constant pressure from Moscow to increase output, finds itself equipped with techniques for encouraging production which are not adapted to dealing with a people who do not view their integration into Soviet society as inevitable. There remain only force and coercion, but these cannot be applied steadily enough to be effective with an entire people. When force was tried during the collectivization drive of the 1930's, the result was a net loss in production from which the economy of Kazakhstan has never fully recovered. Actually, the purges of which the western world is aware tend to be directed more toward the overwhelmingly Slavic membership of the Party, caught on the horns of its dilemma, than toward the Kazakhs who are the cause of the difficulty.

The fact that positions of responsibility are filled by Slavs means that they are almost the only ones in Kazakhstan to be seen enjoying the material rewards so conspicuously granted to members of the Soviet elites. Regardless of whose fault this may be, it must at times breed resentment among the Kazakhs. Similarly, the preponderance of Slavs in higher governmental, Party, executive, and judicial positions means that the Kazakhs are almost never governed, judged, or defended by their fellows. It must often happen that Kazakhs who feel they are the victims of injustice identify this as discrimination.

NATIONALITY POLICY

Soviet policy toward the minority nationalities within the USSR has also created a long-standing dilemma in the case of the Kazakhs—a dilemma which appears to provide an important vulnerability for psychological warfare exploitation. This policy strives to create national political units which are "socialist in content, national in form." This means in effect that the political structure and economy of the various national groups are organized along standard Soviet lines and their energies are directed toward Soviet objectives, but the symbols of nationality (particularly the local languages) are retained to grant a sense of continuity with past traditions. The devising and implementing of this policy was the earliest responsibility assumed by Stalin under Lenin's guidance. It has had varying degrees of success in different areas, but in the balance has proved to be a very useful tool of Soviet administration.

The Kazakhs, however, are a people still too deeply attached to their old life and its traditions and values to accept mere lip service to their national heritage. Every time an effort has been made to raise Kazakh morale and productivity by permitting public attention to national heroes and literature, the result has been an enthusiasm the Soviets have viewed as threatening. This was particularly true when, during World War II, national patriotism was extensively exploited throughout the USSR to inspire the people to defend their homeland. Among the Kazakhs this developed into a cult glorifying their native heroes and culture, a phenomenon which had also appeared during the 1920's and had grown until it became such a threat that it was ruthlessly suppressed by the Soviets. After the war Kazakh nationalism, left unsuppressed, continued to grow in strength until finally in the 1950's a purge was required to check its growing force.

It seems certain that these sentiments will lie for a long time close beneath the surface, available for mobilization through psychological warfare, regardless of the turns Soviet nationality policy might take in the event of another war. For this reason, considerable attention has been devoted in this report to Kazakh history, including its national heroes, and to Kazakh cultural values and traditions.

One method which the Soviets employ to make the minority republics "national in form" is the utilization wherever possible of native Communists to fill positions in the local Party and government. As might be expected, in the Kazakh SSR there is a chronic shortage of

KN 563 631

Preliminary geological surveys had indicated the riches of Kazakhstan in nonferrous metals and liquid and solid fuels, as well as in pastoral products. The Kirgiz republic offered an entirely different economic perspective. Similarly, from the standpoint of ethnic composition, Kazakhstan had a far greater and more diversified minority pattern, the most important of which was the Russian and Ukrainian. These and similar considerations must have impelled the Soviets to separate the two peoples. With the separation of the two political units, the native populations came to be known by the respective names of the republics, the people in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs and those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz.

K [101]

KN [162]

At the time of the 1926 census so few Kazakhs were enumerated in Kirgizia and so few Kirgiz in Kazakhstan—a few thousand in either case—that it seems obvious what must have happened. The division into two republics had taken place a few months before the census. An arbitrary decision must have been made to list all Kirgiz-Kazakhs and Kara-Kirgiz in Kazakhstan as Kazakhs, and all those in Kirgizia as Kirgiz. Those who fell outside this division amounted to two-tenths of one per cent of the total population.

As suggested above, the Soviets have had some idea of determining political boundaries according to economic factors. The valley of the Syr-Darya is split between Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. By consideration of ethnic composition (the area is heavily Uzbek), and for historical and geographical reasons, the entire area should be in Uzbekistan. The triangle between the cities of Tashkent, Dzhambul, and Turkestan is a cotton-growing region; two-thirds of it is in Kazakhstan, despite the fact that cotton is an Uzbek specialty. On the other hand, the coal mining districts of Chimkent and Lenger, also within this triangle, are outside the pattern set down for Uzbekistan. Apparently Kazakhstan is regarded as a center of mining and extractive industries; hence the cotton area was broken up.

KN [248]

KN [316]

As a result of these various factors, many Uzbeks have been deposited in Kazakhstan, and in 1939 more than 300,000 Kazakhs, or 10 per cent of their total number, were living on Uzbek soil. These are Kazakhs who live immediately over the border—not scattered pockets which could be assigned only with difficulty to Kazakh administration. In 1939, because of these and related losses in the north, one-sixth of all Kazakhs in the USSR lived outside Kazakhstan, with the result that they became a minority in their own republic. The process has continued, and today the Kazakhs constitute little more than a third of the population of their native republic. Soon the name Kazakhstan will be an anachronism.

K [101]

[162]

This situation is only in part due to a policy of dividing in order to rule; it is also intended to inundate the Kazakhs with ethnically more reliable elements in order to rule the better.

K [648]

REGIONAL HISTORY AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SETTING

K KN 175

Central Asia has experienced many waves of invasion over the three thousand years of its history. Early invaders were Scythians, ancestors

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

KN 173 believed. These people do not make a distinction between truth and fiction in such matters.

K 173 602 K [698] The preservation of the genealogy likewise establishes a basis for intergroup relationships. In time of need, one Turkic group may call upon another for aid, and may even be adopted into the stronger group. For instance, over many centuries the Uzbeks had gradually drifted apart from the Kazakhs. The Uzbeks are farmers, the Kazakhs herders. The Uzbeks are genuinely Islamic, the Kazakhs only superficially so. Yet within the Uzbek domain one group traced its ancestry back over 800 years to the Kereit, a people mentioned in the chronicles of Genghis Khan. By the 19th century this people had become personified as one man—the founding ancestor Kerei. Among the Kazakhs there existed a group which also called itself Kereit and which traced descent from this ancestor. Eight hundred years after the traditional founding of the line, the Kazakh Kereit joined the Uzbek Kereit as "kinsmen," although a small group did later rejoin the Kazakhs. This episode is recounted by a Kazakh who became a Russian scholar in the 19th century—Valikhanov, a nobleman of high intellectual endowments. How much of the story is romanticized fiction, and how much is fact, is hard to say but that is beside the point. The Kazakhs and the Uzbeks believe it is true and act accordingly.

K KN [166] These principles—which underlie fact—are of signal importance in understanding many experiences recorded in the Soviet period. They make it possible to comprehend why a youth in a Kazakh village in 1950 can recite his ancestry back over many generations. They explain in part (but only in part) how Turks can shift group affiliations, a tendency which makes the interpretation of Soviet census data something of a problem. Such shifting makes for a certain fluidity in the population picture in Central Asia and is one response to excessive rigidity and pressure from Moscow. This fluidity below in response to rigidity from above creates a situation of tension, and is at the same time an expression of that tension. This tense, strained situation will receive much attention in the pages which follow.

THE KAZAKHS

K 175 698 During the 16th century the Kazakhs gradually occupied the steppe between the Altai Mountains in the east and the Ural River in the west, north of the Bet-Pak-Dala (Hungry Steppe) and the Aral Sea. In the same century, Russians and Cossacks entered the farming regions directly north of the Kazakh steppe. To the south, along the Syr-Darya River to the Aral Sea, lay the farming country of the Uzbeks. The Kazakhs of this period were roughly grouped into three clan confederations or hordes: the Great Horde, whose territory traditionally has been in the eastern Kazakh steppe, from the Aral Sea to Balkhash and the southern Altai chain; the Middle Horde, who occupied the central and northern steppe, north of the Aral Sea as far as the black-earth region of southern Siberia, and east to the Altai chain; and the Little Horde, whose territory extended west of the Aral Sea to the Ural River and the northeastern part of the Caspian Sea.

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These Kazakhs were united briefly at the end of the 17th century by the great Khan Tauke (or Tiavka), a leader equally gifted as political integrator and as law-giver. With his death, however, they broke up again into the three hordes.

Cossack lines were established to the north and thrust into the steppes from the northwest during the 18th century. The Russian conquest of Central Asia took place in the 19th century, although Russian penetration had begun in the 18th. The principal patterns—as in the history of many other colonizations—were force, persuasion, and good luck. The Russians were able to play one group against another, for example, Kalmuks against Kazakhs; when native Slavs rebelled under Pugachev, Moscow played Turk against Cossack and Kalmuk against Cossack.

There were several important defections from the side of the Turks to the Russians. A famous Khan of the 1740's, Abul Khair, asked Russian aid in the incessant wars of Turk against Turk on the steppe. Early in the 19th century another Kazakh leader, Khan Bukei, a descendant of Abul Khair, led 1,500 Kazakh families of the Little Horde across the Ural River onto Russian territory, seeking refuge from the steppe wars. By 1805 his horde had grown to 5,000 tents or families, and by 1845 to 30,000. At this point a new horde, the Inner or Bukei Horde, was formed.

How he was able to do this, how it happened that enough room for 30,000 nomadic families could be found between the Ural River and the Volga, is part of the long story of the lasting dissensions and resentments on the steppe. At the beginning of the 17th century the Kalmuks had moved from the eastern steppe (Chinese Dzungaria) to the Volga, and pastured their herds on the steppes between the Ural River and the Volga, north to the Don River and the vicinity of present-day Stalingrad, south to the western shores of the Caspian Sea. In 1771, thousands of them fled across Turkestan back to China, decimated as they moved by their Turkish enemies, the Bashkirs, Kazakhs, and Kirgiz. Those Kalmuks who remained lived west of the Volga, and the steppe to the east as far as the Ural River was left free. This part of the steppe was left as a vacuum because Tsarist policy established a military line of Cossack settlements[1] along the Ural River down to the Caspian, which prevented movement into the steppe. In 1800, Khan Bukei petitioned Moscow for permission to occupy this steppe and Moscow, to gain an ally in the steppe, granted the petition, thus conforming to the old political adage of divide and rule. The new horde was called the Inner Horde, because it lay within the Cossack lines, or the Bukei Horde, after its founder.

The only constant pattern in the history of the steppe nomadic culture has been that of instability. With no over-all political order, it was inevitable that Russian "protection" should be sought by particular factions while others held aloof.

During the 19th century the Kazakhs engaged the Russians in a number of sporadic wars and rebellions. The leaders of these movements have been variously depicted as great liberators or as feudal lords who, jealous of their domains, refused to let the Russians in.

[1]Dispersed after the Revolution.

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One of the earliest rebels against the Russians was Batyr Srym,[1] a member of the lesser Kazakh aristocracy of the Little Horde, that part of Kazakhdom closest to European Russia. Srym led a series of rebellions against the Russians, interspersed with some campaigning on their behalf, in the latter part of the 18th century. In 1776 he was one of the Kazakh leaders who supported Pugachev, a Russian Cossack who had led the Cossacks in a rebellion supported by some of the native populations, against Catherine II. After the Pugachev rebellion was suppressed, Batyr Srym maintained friendly relations with the Russians until 1783, when a series of border incidents between Cossacks and Kazakhs broke out. Srym was captured by Cossacks and was released only when Nurali, khan of the Little Horde, paid ransom for him. Later, however, Srym's popularity appeared dangerous to Nurali, and both he and the Russians campaigned against Srym. In 1785 the Russian authorities sought to deal directly with Srym and the lesser Kazakh nobles rather than with their khan, who had little authority over them. The Russians now had the Kazakhs split. On Nurali's death his followers elected one of his sons to succeed him, Batyr Srym and his nobles elected another. The Russians succeeded in gaining control of the office of khan, which led Srym to seek the abolition of the institution of the khanate. In this he failed. The proposed reform was too radical, and the Russians successfully opposed it. They cut Srym from his fellow nobles, whom they now gathered under a leader of their own choosing, the Sultan Aichubek. Srym fled to the Khanate of Khiva, far to the south, in 1797. There he died in a raid in 1802.

Between 1820 and 1850 a series of campaigns were conducted against the Russians by such Kazakh leaders as Nurmuhammed, Isatai Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov. All were defeated, and there was little organized resistance among the Kazakhs in the latter part of the century. Among these men, who still survive in the folk memory as popular heroes, the most important was Kenesary.

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Kenesary Kasymov, born in the same year in which Srym died, was a member of the highest Kazakh nobility, a royal sultan of the Middle Horde. Continuing the policy so successful among the Little Horde, the Russians sought to take away the sovereign power from the hereditary ruling family and transform the sultanship into a matter of Russian election; they also withdrew two of the most fertile pasture lands of the Middle Horde, the Ishim and Tobol valleys. Kenesary asked support from the ruler of Tashkent, who answered by killing his emissaries. Thus, by the 1830's, the Middle Horde was caught in a squeeze between the Russians to the north and the Tashkent begs (chiefs) to the south. Defeated to the south, Kenesary fought a guerilla campaign against the Russians to the north. He was elected khan by leaders of the Middle Horde and certain elements of the Little Horde as well, and during the early 1840's he gained many followers among the Little Horde. The Russians, unable to defeat him, erected a line of fortifications deep into the steppe along the Turgay and Irgiz rivers. Kenesary thus was pressed from the north and west as well as from the south. Turning

[1]Batyr is a title signifying lesser noble rank.

east, he gained support among many elements of the Great Horde, the easternmost of the Kazakh divisions. He sought the support of China, which was promised him, and the allegiance of the Kirgiz, which they refused. His strategy was to use the Kirgiz mountain pastures as his base of operations against the Russians. He campaigned against the Kirgiz and was at first successful, but in the spring of 1847 he fell into a trap, was defeated by the Kirgiz, taken prisoner, and executed.

During much of Russian rule Kazakhstan was a place of exile. Banished there were such outstanding individuals as Taras Shevchenko, the national poet of the Ukraine, and Dostoevsky, great Russian novelist.

In the economic sphere, outside capital was brought in during this period by traders and bankers of Tatar and Russian origin. In an isolated case, a British mining development was undertaken at Ridders in northeast Kazakhstan. Religious dissidents came to settle and farm the north and northeast portions of the region. In general, however, the commercial and cultural ties between Kazakhstan and Russia were not deep.

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1900

The Kazakhs were sensitive to political developments in Russia, however. During the revolution of 1905 the Kazakhs had a distant echo of the events in European Russia. During World War I they engaged in a rebellion of their own, a year before the Russian Revolution of 1917. In this revolt the Kazakhs objected to military conscription and to confiscation of their property, which was presumably taken over for war purposes but in fact often ended up in private, non-military hands. There is some indication that Russian private interests "provoked" the revolt in order to confiscate Kazakh land and herds.

At the time of the 1917 Revolution, the Kazakhs already had a year's experience of revolt behind them. In opposition to and under the influence of Russian contact, the Kazakhs underwent their own political evolution; that is, they evolved a political expression of their nationalist consciousness. It took the form of the Alash-Orda party. This was not really a party, for it lacked a formal organization and a platform or explicit political philosophy; it was vague in its aims and in its external relationships to other parties and nations. Its leaders were Kazakh intellectuals who later disbanded, some joining the Bolsheviks, some fleeing to Turkey.

During the civil war, from 1918 to 1922, the White generals Kolchak and Dutov were faced by the Red Army commander, Frunze, who appealed to the workers in Turkestan to support him. In April 1919 the Central Committee of the Party issued a decree calling for a founding Congress of Kirgiz Soviets in Orenburg (now Chkalov, in the southern Urals). In July of that year, a Revolutionary Committee for the Administration of the Kirgiz Districts was established. (At that time, the area including the present Kazakh and Kirgiz republics was administered as one unit, which bore the name Kirgiz.)

By the end of 1919, Kolchak was defeated. With the destruction of Kolchak's southern army in the fall of 1919, direct contact between

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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Central Asia and Soviet Russia was established, and in March 1920 the last remnants of the White Army were driven out of Kazakhstan.

A Communist Party organization was quickly formed in the newly won territories. The Central Committee of the Party set up a Province Bureau, in which were united all party organizations, at Aktyubinsk in May 1920, and in October a founding Congress of the Kirgiz (Kazakh) Soviets was held in Orenburg, then the regional capital.

Kazakh participation in the Revolution and civil war was minimal. Their political energy was poured into local Turkic movements rather than into the Bolshevik party. They took little initiative in aligning with the Russian Revolution, and played only a small part in Frunze's campaigns, despite his appeals; their partisan activity in the civil war is skipped over in contemporary accounts. Certainly no Kazakh appears in the leadership of the Bolshevik movement in the early period. Years later, in a search for an honor roll of revolutionary Kazakh leaders, a certain Amangeldy was singled out, and collective farms and administrative districts were named in his honor. It appears, however, that at the time of the Revolution he had acquired little fame.

FORMATION OF POLITICAL DIVISIONS IN THE SOVIET PERIOD

KN [175] [698]

The Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic was formed in 1918; in 1922 it federated with the Belo-Russian, Ukrainian, and Transcaucasian soviet socialist republics to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In 1925, the Transcaucasian SSR was divided into the three present republics of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, and two autonomous republics, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, were raised to the status of union republics.

Prior to 1917 Russian Turkestan was divided into three political units, the province of Turkestan and two vassal states of Russia, the Khanate of Khiva and the Emirate of Bukhara. The Revolution and the civil war changed the social structure of Turkestan and with it the administrative picture. The Red Army dissolved the principality of Khiva in 1919; the Emirate of Bukhara was invaded in 1920 and the Emir driven out. In 1920 the Kazakhs, Kirgiz, and Karakalpaks were organized into the Kirgiz Autonomous SSR. In 1924 Kazakhstan was made an autonomous republic and separated from the Kirgiz ASSR; both republics, however, were still part of the RSFSR and were administered from Moscow. The Karakalpak Autonomous Region was attached to the Kazakh ASSR until 1931, when it was assigned to the Uzbek SSR. With the adoption of the Stalin Constitution in 1936, Kazakhstan was separated from the RSFSR and made a union republic, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, its present status.

THE CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT

KN 169

There is a steady flow of people across the Central Asian borders of the Soviet Union. It would of course be a mistake to regard the

8:Krader & Wayne .E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

Chapter 2

A DEMOGRAPHIC SKETCH[1]

161 It is the history of the population trends of the Kazakhs which singles this people out for study among all the peoples of Central Asia. Comparison of the two censuses which the Soviets have published, in 1926 and in 1939, shows that the Kazakhs suffered severe population losses between those years. Longer-term trends show that they constitute an ever-decreasing proportion of the people living in their native land. These population factors are of immediate interest in the study of the Kazakhs, but in addition it is obvious that the history of a people is closely related to the fate of its numbers, their growth and decline, and the possible causes one can find for these trends.

KAZAKHS PRIOR TO 1917

The Kazakh population figures indicate great oscillations over the past century; great increases are followed by sharp dips. Close study of these demographic trends should reveal many clear reflections of Kazakh internal developments and relations with other peoples—their neighbors and conquerors.

[648] The first estimates of the numerical strength of the Kazakhs appeared shortly after the Russian penetration into Turkestan early in the 19th century. At that time the Russians had not yet conquered all the Kazakhs; many peoples of Central Asia, including part of the Kazakhs, were still either semi-independent, living in the khanates of Bukhara, Khiva, and Kokand, or else under Chinese rule. Early Russian travelers, explorers, commercial agents, and intelligence agents began to bring back information about the Kazakhs, including population estimates.

[1] Space for reporting the study of Kazakh demography is limited. In the few pages of this report devoted to this rich topic only a few of the many data and analyses available can be introduced. During the past few years, Dr. Frank Lorimer has directed the study of Kazakh demography by Miss Faye Goldware and Mr. John Grauman (89). The reports on Kazakh demography prepared by and under Dr. Lorimer are available at the Bureau of Social Science Research and at the Bureau of the Census. The contents of this chapter have drawn heavily upon the work of these persons, and for fuller treatment and documentation of the topic the reader is directed to their writings. Responsibility for the conclusions drawn and for the formulations in this chapter rests, of course, only with those who have contributed to this report.

595 Traditionally, the Kazakh was permitted to have more than one wife. However, very few men were able to afford the expense involved, because [583] marriage required large payments by the family of the groom to the family of the bride. For those who could afford it, the possession of many [554] wives meant an increase in prestige and status. Sometimes a man took another wife because he had not had any sons by the first wife. But in general, even though plural wives were permitted, such marriages were few in number. In 1926, only 104.5 women were reported as married [169] per 100 married men, exclusive of widows and divorcees. In Tsarist times the number was not much larger. At present polygamy is forbid- [648] den by law. Nevertheless, it is stubbornly maintained by the Kazakhs, and cases are constantly being reported and denounced in the Soviet [554] press. It is still a matter of status and prestige; the bulk of the polygamous marriages reported today involve men of high position in Soviet life, such as Kazakhs who are presidents of collective farms.

233 The Kazakh herds are composed of sheep, goats, cattle, horses, and 221 camels, usually in that numerical order. Herds cannot be maintained through the entire year in one place, because the grass on the steppes is not rich enough to support them. They must move from month to month and from season to season. However, there are too many herdsmen and not enough steppeland to permit indiscriminate wandering. The usual pattern is for a nomadic camp to set up winter quarters where many smaller herding groups come together for religious and economic purposes. Here they store their hay through the winter to feed the livestock, and put up windbreaks against the winter storms. In the early spring they disperse into smaller herding groups of a few families each, and proceed over traditionally fixed grazing routes to the summer camp which they occupy until early fall. Nomadism is a fixed annual round of movement, not a haphazard one.

166 The 1926 census reported that 5.6 per cent of the Kazakh males had established residence outside the district in which they had been born. The comparable figure for women was 20 per cent. The explanation for 591 this difference lies in the marriage customs, under which a Kazakh woman traditionally moves to her husband's family residence. It is almost unheard of for a man to move to the home of his wife's kin or for both to move together to a new residence. Most of the marriages involved a woman's moving only a short distance to her husband's family. But at least a fifth of the women had to move away from their native [584] districts; this usually meant that the marriage had been arranged for them at some distance from their birthplaces.

No significant changes in Kazakh life had taken place by the time 197 the first Soviet census was taken in 1926. The first few years of Soviet- 648 ization had left the Kazakhs more or less untouched. Their economic life, their family life, and the traditional organization of their society had changed only externally. They had come under the unified rule of Moscow instead of continuing their own loose social groupings, but Moscow had not yet begun the transformation of Kazakh life, nor had the Kazakhs yet faced the problems involved in accommodating to or resisting Soviet influence.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

THE PERIOD 1926-1939

At the end of the 1920's the Soviets decided to collectivize the nomads of Central Asia, by which they meant causing them to settle down in collective farms. The first Five-Year Plan envisaged settling 383,000 of these nomadic households by 1933. By 1930, 50,000 nomadic Kazakh households were so immobilized, but 567,000 out of 829,000 households, or 67 per cent, were still nomadic. During the following year, 95,000 more households were transferred from nomadism to farming and other sedentary occupations. In 1932 an intensive drive was started to collectivize the nomadic herdsmen as well, but without compulsory sedentarization; collectivization no longer meant settling down.

Apparently, many of those nomads who had been sedentarized in the first Five-Year Plan did not remain on the farms. Kazakhs traditionally abhorred farming. They regarded it as woman's work, as work of the poor and of those who could not make a success of herding. For a man to become a farmer meant loss of status, loss of manhood and virility. The Sarts, for example, a farming and trading people of Central Asia composed of former herdsmen, were despised by the nomads. Only half of those households which had been announced as collectivized remained so. In 1934, it was announced that only 76,000 households of the 145,000 noted above had been permanently settled in 1932. Between 1933 and 1935 slightly under 200,000 households were added to this roll, making a total of about one quarter of a million households which had been sedentarized. In addition, there was some movement of nomad households across the border into other republics or into China. In 1935 there were 158,000 fully nomadic Kazakh households, as compared with 567,000 five years earlier.

The total number of those employed in Kazakhstan in 1931 was 495,100, of whom 125,100 were in agriculture. By 1935 the total figure had risen to 585,700, and the agricultural component to 165,800. The total figure rose to about 700,000 in 1937 and to 820,000 in 1940.

There were 16,184 persons employed in industry in Kazakhstan in 1927, of whom 20.8 per cent were Kazakhs. In 1933, the number of industrial workers had risen to 56,484; of these, 23,784, or 42.1 per cent, were Kazakhs. At the end of 1934, the total was 71,627, of whom 29,022 or 40.5 per cent were Kazakhs.

The total population of Kazakhs was reported in 1926 as 3,968,289; in 1939 their number was given as 3,098,764. They had thus lost in absolute terms about 900,000 people between the two censuses, or approximately 22 per cent of their number in 1926. In the same period, the population of the entire USSR had increased by 15.9 per cent. It has been argued that under normal conditions the Kazakh rate of increase would have been higher than the average for the USSR as a whole. (The populations of the neighboring republics of Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan, for instance, which are composed of ethnic groups similar to the Kazakhs, have increased at a rate much higher than that of the entire USSR.) At any rate, if the Kazakhs had increased only at the USSR average rate, they would have numbered about 4,500,000 in 1939. Thus their real loss

161 may be estimated at approximately 1,400,000, if one adds to the actual loss of 900,000 the expected natural increase of 500,000.

A number of arguments have been advanced to account for both the 648 actual and the estimated losses. Each has a certain merit, and no single one of them should be pursued at the expense of all the others.

[167] The Soviet explanation is that people from Kazakhstan moved away to the new industrial enterprises of the southern Urals and southern Siberia and to the neighboring Central Asia republics, the Uzbek, Tadzhik, Turkmen, and Kirgiz SSR's. This interpretation has not been accompanied by any data. The figures quoted here have been the totals of those listed as Kazakhs in the USSR censuses regardless of place of residence. Therefore, the Soviet statement must mean not only that hundreds of thousands of Kazakhs migrated from Kazakhstan to other parts of the USSR, but also that they gave up their Kazakh nationality in doing so.

[177] This may be part of the story but it cannot be the whole. It is known that the Russians looked with favor on the Russification of native populations and their absorption into the Russian ethnic group, regardless of their forebears. German and Austrian prisoners of war who were sent to Kazakhstan report that many Kazakhs, identifiable by their physiognomy, by their personal and family names, and by their own account of 161 their past, were nevertheless designated Russian in their official papers. 648 But certainly 900,000 of them did not become Russian.

[474] During the course of collectivization many Kazakhs were liquidated by the GPU, primarily during the period between the two censuses. [565] Those liquidated were people who resisted collectivization, but they were listed as remnants of the former nobility and wealthy people of Kazakhstan. This class was known as the feudal bays. About 700 bay families per year were liquidated, that is turned over to the GPU, during the three-year period 1928-1930. In 1931 it was announced that 23,000 households of bays were to be liquidated. This made an announced total of 25,000 households subject to GPU measures. If all these people were actually liquidated (that is, left to starve or otherwise badly treated), then some 125,000 Kazakhs were eliminated by these means. This is the largest figure for population losses that can be assigned to police measures on the basis of published data.

[233] It has been stated that between 1930 and 1935, at the height of the [162] drive for collectivization, the number of Kazakh households engaged in the traditional herding occupation dropped from 567,000 to 158,000. Many of these households went into agriculture and some into industry [167] in Kazakhstan, but others moved across the border, either into neighboring republics or out of the Soviet realm into bordering China. During the 1920's and the first part of the 1930's considerable cross-border movement was still permitted into China and back, according to age-old nomadic patterns. The border was closed in the mid-1930's, and possibly some Kazakhs remained outside the USSR by choice; for example, there is a colony of approximately 30,000 Kazakhs in Outer Mongolia. However, to assign numbers to the population loss in Soviet Kazakhstan through this cross-border movement is a hopeless task.

Again, no reliable estimate has been given for the number of Kazakhs who might have gone over to the neighboring republics within the Soviet Union.

the Soviet Union. Traditionally, peoples of Central Asia were able to leave their native pastures when times were bad and claim hospitality among other more fortunate Turkic groups. Instances have been reported in the 19th and 20th centuries of groups of Kazakhs whose herds had been depleted through drought or plague doing this; some even joined Uzbek groups, on the basis of descent from a common ancestor. Such an argument would hold only for the Uzbeks, the Kirgiz, and the Karakalpaks. It is not applicable to the Tadzhiks, and certainly not to the Russians. According to a long-established cultural pattern, Kazakhs who leave herding for farming join another group, such as Sart, for example, or Karakalpak, according to the area in which they have settled.

The general consideration of shifts in ethnic identification raises the problem of the smaller peoples of Central Asia. Aside from the many millions of Kazakhs, Uzbeks, and Kirgiz, there are various small groups, none of which number more than fifty-odd thousand. These smaller groups, who together number about one quarter of a million people, have suffered the same fate of cultural levelling, absorption, and elimination of cultural differences that has taken place throughout the Soviet world from the Caucasus to the Bering Sea. The cost of administering many small peoples is too great a luxury for the USSR to afford; the Soviets have ceased to regard these peoples as independent entities, and have awarded the highest honors to those ethnologists who have justified the formation of ever larger groups of peoples.

In 1926 more than 200,000 Kazakhs lived within the 1930 boundaries of Uzbekistan, exclusive of the Karakalpak ASSR, and 86,000 Kazakhs were living in what is today Karakalpakia. The Karakalpaks are a people closely related to the Kazakhs; they are in the main Kazakhs who a few centuries ago settled down to farming. They still maintain strong ethnic ties to the Kazakhs, and linguistically are barely distinguishable from them. The Karakalpaks increased from 146,000 to 186,000 between 1926 and 1939, an increase of 27 per cent and the highest gain of all the Central Asiatic peoples during that period. Part of this gain may have been due to the decision of Kazakhs to declare themselves Karakalpaks, or the decision of the census authorities to list the Kazakhs as Karakalpaks. The latter alternative is implausible, because it would have the Soviets contributing further to a population picture of the Kazakhs which was already unfavorable. Marxist theory rejects the capitalistic Malthusian concept, and extreme population losses are embarrassing for the Communists to explain.

From 1929 to 1933 the total livestock in Kazakhstan dropped from nearly 40,000,000 to 5,000,000 head. This was a disastrous blow to the nomads. The number of sheep and goats dropped by about 90 per cent. More than two-thirds of the horses and three-quarters of the cattle died in those years; between 1930 and 1933 more than 90 per cent of the camels died. Without these animals, the nomads cannot live. The farmer can store his grain, but the nomad can store food only on the hoof. When a head of stock dies on the steppes either it is eaten or it rots. The nomad's staple is milk, which he cannot store. These losses in livestock give some idea of the starvation conditions which prevailed during 1930-1933. Hundreds of thousands of nomads must either have

each clan had a territory distinctly its own, separated by widely recognized boundaries from the territories of neighboring clans. Lineages within each clan likewise had pasture lands of their own, the land of each lineage separate from the others; villages had separate lands for their own grazing, and known routes over which they moved from pasturage to pasturage in a fixed annual round.[1]

There is thus a correlation between neighborhood and kinship; the closest neighbor of the Kazakh household head was most likely to be his brother, father, father's brother, or father's brother's son. This close relation between the two social bonds is of more than theoretical interest; it has been the basis for an ideological warfare among various Soviet camps in different periods of recent history. Another feature of Kazakh society clarifies this relationship between kinship and neighborhood. The social bond of the Kazakhs, the means whereby two individuals demonstrate their membership in the common society of Kazakhdom, is the genealogical tree. Because of Kazakh nomadism, the relationships among the different branches, whether clans or lineages or villages, are loose, occasional. If two Kazakhs meet and are unknown to each other, they trace their genealogies for each other until a common ancestor is found. This common ancestor then becomes the point of reference for the two, the means whereby they establish whether they are more or less equals, or if not, which is superior. The ancestor in common establishes a basis for mutual aid and cooperation.

The number of generations traced in the genealogies to a common ancestor determines the closeness of the relationship; the fewer the generations, the closer the kinship, and the closer in space are the villages, camps, and pasturages of the Kazakhs. These genealogies are the membership roll, the constitution, the charter of incorporation, and the historical record of the different groups; they are either recited baldly, in answer to questions concerning ancestry, or they are the skeleton around which folk epics are created.[2] These folk epics, which have suffered a peculiar fate under the Soviets, are long recitations or chants concerning the deeds of the ancestors. The Soviet-era epics of Djambul are quite different; Djambul's so-called epics are songs in praise of Stalin.

Kazakh descent lines are not all equal; a father who is the founding ancestor of all the members of a horde or clan or village may have several sons, who are ranked according to their order of birth, the eldest son having the highest rank. The descendants of the sons will then recognize among themselves a relative rank order according to which of the sons they were descended from. The father or founding ancestor of the entire line is himself a member of a still larger group with rank according to order of birth and descent.[3]

The division of Kazakh society into social classes is also related to the ranking of descent lines. The same ties of blood and common

[1] Radloff (105), 1891, pp. LI-LVI.
[2] Samoilovich, in Radenko *et al*, 1930, pp. 306 ff. For a genealogy still preserved today, see Makanov, 1947, pp. 1-28.
[3] Khorezin, 1889, pp. 41-42.

These apparent contradictions arise because Kazakh society is an amalgam of kin and political relationships. 182

Soviet writers in Central Asia find it difficult to explain the inconsistencies in Kazakh society; this difficulty is due in part to the series of readymade categories of evolution which Communism teaches. They are dealing not with abstractions but with living people, whose lives are complex. The Kazakhs have lived on the margins of great empires—Persian, Chinese, Russian—for many centuries. They themselves have participated in great empires, their own and others'. Not only the glory, but some of the institutions, have rubbed off on them; they have developed certain institutions which are normally part of states and empires. At times they have formed states and empires, and at times they have contracted to form smaller units. 177

During the 1920's, a group of Kazakh intellectuals, together with certain romantically disposed Russians, constructed a picture of Kazakh society in which each social unit formed a closely-knit cooperative core. All members of a village helped each other, since all were united by ties of blood and neighborhood. The Kazakh intellectuals included former leaders, such as Baitursunov and Bukeikhanov, of the Alash-Orda, the Kazakh political party of the period 1917-1922. Ryskulov and Sadvokasov, also Kazakhs, propounded the same idea; the Russian scholars Polochanskii, Kushner, and, as late as 1933, Fedorov continued along the same line.[1] 829 [668]

With the onset of collectivization, the Soviet government could no longer let these theories continue unopposed. In 1926 Moscow began to denounce the notion of the persistence of primeval communist conditions among the Kazakhs into the era of the Russian Revolution. The Soviet boss of Kazakhstan, Goloshchekin, attacked the concept of the Kazakh nomadic village as a communal, cooperative, undifferentiated whole. Between 1928 and 1930 the government of Kazakhstan handed over each year to the GPU hundreds of Kazakh families classified as enemies of the workers. The campaign to exterminate the rich Kazakhs as exploiters of the poor intensified between 1930 and 1933. The aim of this campaign was to bring the Kazakh herdsman into collective farm life, to settle him down as a tiller of the soil, as well as to find the equivalents among the Kazakhs of the rich peasants of Russia. The aul was equated by Goloshchekin with a peasant village anywhere; the wealthy Kazakh villager was equated with the Kulak, and thus regarded as subject to liquidation.[2] 177 648 [474]

This policy became the official line, and the forces advocating the theory of communal economy and polity were silenced. One theory advanced in support of the new line stated that the Tsarist colonialists supported the village leaders as a counterpoise to the khans and the sultans, and used the local leader as a lever to crush the rule of the khans. According to this theory, the khans were of foreign birth and the village leaders, pictured as allies of the Tsars, were of Kazakh birth.[3]

[1] Tagishaev, 1934, pp. 6-8, 23.
[2] Goloshchekin, 1931, pp. 177-198, 208.
[3] Tagishaev, 1934, pp. 38-39.

177 648 According to the official line, Kazakh society belonged to the feudal stage of development at the time of the Russian conquest. This formulation has survived to the present day. It is supported by a stage theory of history, derived from Karl Marx. According to this theory, all societies prior to the Russian Revolution were either tribal or divided into classes; class societies were either capitalist or feudal. According to this theory the Kazakhs are not tribal because they are divided into classes, but they are not capitalist; therefore they are feudal. Never, however, did the proponents of this theory make a detailed comparison between Kazakh society and the nations of medieval Europe.

[668] The Kazakhs, by this doctrine, were permitted to retain their national heroes, the khans of old, among them the leaders of revolts against the Russian conquest, Batyr Srym, Taimanov, Kenesary, Nurmuhammed. In the Soviet Union of the 1930's, the Tsars were still considered hated oppressors of all men, Russians and non-Russians, in the Russian empire. The Tsars were an absolute and unrelieved evil, and a war for colonial liberation was progressive and good. Yet during the 1930's, writers tended to stay away from the description of these revolts against the Tsars by Kazakhs and other peoples. Most of the writings were concerned with such topics as Kazakh participation in the 1905 revolution, or the revolt of the Kazakhs in 1916. During World [538] War II, however, a number of books and articles were written describing the 19th century revolts as great events, true expressions of anti-Tsarist sentiment, part of the general hatred of Tsarism in which the Bolsheviks shared. Vlatkin, Bekmakhanov, Shoinbaev and others—for the most part Kazakhs—wrote in admiration of the Kenesarys and Taimanovs.

Then with the 1950's began a violent purge of these writings. In the current phase, Tsarism is still regarded as an exploiting and oppressive institution, but a new twist has been added to the story. The Tsars by their conquests are now said to have saved the Turks of Central Asia from an even worse fate, conquest by English and the Germans, by Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism. Pan-Turkism would bring all Turks together under one government—not that of Moscow—and is subjected to the most bitter denunciations by the Soviet press as bourgeois-nationalist, cosmopolitan, and so forth. Pan-Islamism would bring all Moslems together, Turks, Persians, and Arabs; although it is somewhat less realistic in its appeal to the Kazakhs, it is also sharply denounced in the Soviet press.

Whether England or Germany or the Pan-Turks would have swallowed up Central Asia is a matter of historical speculation which need not detain us here. On the other hand, the denunciation by the modern Soviet writers of the older Kazakh leaders such as Kenesary and Taimanov is of great interest. The Soviet specialists in Central Asia seek to differentiate Kazakh revolts into two types, those which were progressive and those which were not. The revolts of Nurmuhammed, Taimanov, and Kenesary Kasymov are all depicted as reactionary and antihistorical, because they sought to tear the Kazakhs away from the Russian empire and to retain the age-old oppression by the khans. Other figures such [668] as Batyr Srym are treated as progressive historically because they led a revolt not against the Tsars but against the nobility of their own society.

This distinction made between Batyr Srym and Kenesary by Soviet historians reflects the current Soviet attitude toward past leaders. These early khans who are now denounced are the national and cultural heroes of the Kazakhs. They are celebrated in the folk literature, the poetry, and the tales which parents tell their children; they are the basis of common comparisons ("as brave as . . ., as clever as . . ."). For the Kazakhs these figures are symbols of their unity as a people. Moreover, they are the ancestors of those living today, according to the traditional Kazakh ties of descent and blood. In denouncing them, the Soviets are denouncing and insulting the very people most venerated by the Kazakhs, aristocrats and commoners alike.

The hold of the olden khans still continues after more than 30 years of Soviet rule. The Kazakh native writers demonstrate a profound desire to seize upon these old figures for literary and historical themes. They stubbornly resist relinquishment of these themes when the official line changes anew. Despite three years of the sharpest attacks and polemics, adulation of the ancient heroes continues in the literature, in films, in classroom textbooks, in official histories; its eradication is a concern of the Soviet regime today.[1]

KAZAKH LIFE IN 1950

The preceding description of the traditional Kazakh society and culture was included not only as background to the present, but primarily because whole sectors of Kazakhs continue more or less unchanged in that way of life, even though they are now members of a collective farm. Traditional Kazakh culture includes forces which have blocked accommodation to the Soviet pattern and forces which have permitted Sovietization. These forces will be taken up in turn.

In rural Kazakhstan, Kazakhs live in collective farms either as herders or as combined herders and farmers. They form the greater proportion of the population in the regions which are primarily devoted to herding, western and west-central Kazakhstan. Here they continue the old nomad life, pasturing their herds of sheep, goats, horses, cattle, and camels from winter camp to summer, reversing their path and completing the cycle in the fall. The winter camps are the focal points of community life, the stable centers of the annual round. Here after the summer dispersal the Kazakhs return to large adobe houses, structures which contain not only quarters for the extended family, but also stables, connecting corridors, and rooms for the storage of hay. Some of these house-stable-barn structures are a century old; it was about one hundred years ago that domiciles of this type were introduced into the area.[2]

The extended families and villages have been the basis of Kazakh adaptation to Sovietization. Kazakh herders continue to live in kin units, with the old aul or nomadic village as the core of the herding

[1] *Pravda*, 26 Dec 50, 19 Apr 51, and 23 Oct 52; *Voprosy Istorii*, 1951, No. 4, pp. 3-15.
[2] Korbe and Makhova, 1952, pp. 43-45.

621 kolkhoz. On the other hand, those Kazakhs who have changed from herding to farming live in villages which are no longer kin communities. The background of this differentiation antedates the Revolution, and is an important part of Kazakh developments during the last hundred years.

●648 197 In the period from 1850 to 1917 the Russians gradually took over the more fertile sections of the steppe in the north, especially along lake shores and river banks, and in mountain piedmont. This left less steppe, and less fertile steppe, for the rapidly increasing Kazakh population. The impoverished Kazakhs were impelled to take up agriculture, which requires less territory per individual than does herding; in regions having sufficient annual rainfall to support cultivation, farming is a more efficient use of the land and hence permits greater density of population. Where the Kazakhs were thus forced to take up agriculture, they tended to break up the kinship units. The agricultural villages are 621 larger than the nomadic, and are composed of broken clans, broken lineages, villages, and families.

Many Kazakh communities survived this impact and managed to maintain their herding pattern, usually in conjunction with a certain minimum amount of farming, which was done in the vicinity of the winter camp by the women and the poor. Communities of this kind comprise the norm to this day; farming among such villages and kolkhozy is largely concerned with raising feed for the livestock. These communi- 474 ties have, as a general rule, gone over bodily into the collective farm 621 system. One such collective farm is the Belbasar Kolkhoz in the Dzhambul region, in the valley of the Chu River. This farm is composed of 116 households; of these 100 are Kazakh, all of the same lineage, the Akhsha lineage of the Dulat clan of the Great Horde. Of the remaining [563] households, 13 are Azerbaijani, two are Russian, and one is a Kazakh who came to this kolkhoz from the Middle Horde in 1942 as a blacksmith. The head of one of the Russian families is a carpenter, the other a kolkhoz leader.[1]

This collective farm in the south appears in striking contrast to those in the north, in the farming zone of the Semipalatinsk region, for example, where Kazakh clan and lineage affiliations are mixed and confused. The Kazakhs of southeast Kazakhstan know their horde and clan affiliations; they are all of the Great Horde, and of one of four clans. Korbe compiled a list of 11 collective farms in this area in which the core population consisted of members of a specific lineage of a specific clan. It thus seems clear that in this part of Kazakhstan the anvil upon which the collective farm pattern was hammered out was the descent group and the kin village. Here, then, is a Kazakh institution which served as a means of accommodation to the Soviet pattern.[2]

The kin village and lineage were the channels through which the Kazakh herdsmen passed into the collective farm life. That the passage was made indicates the force which these institutions have even today.

621 The traditional function of the nomadic village was to organize the annual movements of the member families as a collective enterprise

[1]Korbe, 1960, p. 71.
[2]Ibid., pp. 71-72.

it out. The attempts by the Soviet regime to cause the Kazakhs to conform to their plan are trial and error procedures which sometimes succeed, sometimes fail. They work where the Kazakhs accept, they fail where the Kazakhs are able to reject Soviet culture. Where the Kazakhs accept, it is because they already possessed cultural institutions similar to those which the Soviet regime wished them to have. The ease with which the Kazakh family and village organization moved over into the collective farm structure illustrates this. Both the traditional Kazakh and the Soviet village and rural family are based on close internal cooperation; the core population of both the prerevolutionary and the modern village are kinsmen.

Alternatively, the Kazakhs accept Soviet culture where their native institutions have been crushed and the Soviet institution simply imposed from above. An instance of this is the class structure and the government structure related to it. The Kazakh ruling class, the hereditary nobility, was driven out, and the corresponding form of local government collapsed. It was replaced by the present regime of Soviet functionaries and the Soviet state structure within which they take their places. It seems generally true that the small-scale institutions of the steppe peoples such as family and kinship are stabler, more constant than the larger ones, such as state and empire.[1]

The Soviet culture has been rejected by the Kazakhs where no native customs or institutions existed upon which the new pattern could be imposed. Thus the Soviet concept of a fraternity of nationalities combined to form the USSR has no place in Kazakh life. The Kazakhs have had no especially friendly relations with the Russians; on the contrary, in the 19th century they hated the Russians as colonialists and frequently rose in revolt against them. At present, relations have not improved; the Kazakhs have no reason—political, economic, or cultural—to accept the Russian regime more closely now than they did in the past. If one finds no evidence today of revolts in Central Asia, it is because Soviet control over the Kazakhs is far more efficient than that of the Tsars. And if there were revolts or other expressions of mass unrest, resentment, feelings of injustice, and the like, word of them would not reach the western world until the Soviet press chose to mention them.

The theory of controlled acculturation remains a theory, the western formulation of Soviet policy. It is in contrast with the western approach, which does not conceive of culture in terms of a controlling plan. Kazakh culture has been disrupted through incorporation into the Soviet Union; there are gaps in the fabric of their society resulting from the rapid acculturation. The traditional has not been entirely replaced by the new. Two reasons may be adduced for this: resistance by the Kazakhs, and faulty or inadequate planning by the Soviets. The deficiencies in the planning have tended to increase the degree of the resistance.

[1] Krader (77), 1953.

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4 March 1952	– At the Sixth Congress of the Kazakh Komsomol, the regional committees of South Kazakhstan, Dzhambul, Kzyl-Orda, and Alma-Ata regions, were denounced for failing to combat inequalities in female education.
7 July 1953	– Article of similar tenor on the Kzyl-Orda Region.
2, 3, and 4 April 1953	– Komsomol Congress. Again survivals of traditional religion are denounced with reference to Kzyl-Orda, Dzhambul, and South Kazakhstan regions.

All the regions cited in which the religious issue has been raised lie in the southern part of Kazakhstan, with the exception of the one case noted for Pavlodar, in the north. The south is the zone of sedentary agricultural tradition, heavily Islamicized for many centuries. Moreover, in many regions of the south there is a large Uzbek population.

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Even if Grigoriev's account of the lack of Islamic influence in the southern part of the Kazakh steppe was true for his day, this situation no longer exists. Tsarist and Soviet policies have combined the Uzbeks with the Kazakhs for administrative purposes, and cultural interaction between these two peoples has increased in the past century. As a result, more of Islam has appeared among the Kazakhs in the south than in the center or the north, a reversal of the trend described by Grigoriev.

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The policy of political combination on an ever-increasing scale has also been applied to the Kazakhs in the religious domain. As a consequence, Kazakh representatives have appeared at official Soviet-Moslem congresses sponsored by Moscow, and they occupy a high place in the Moslem religious administration. The world of Islam within the USSR is divided into four regional administrations under the supreme presidency of the grand Mufti-al-Islam, whose seat is in Ufa, the capital of Soviet Bashkiria. The present incumbent is the Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev. The four regional administrations are:[1]

(1) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the RSFSR, at Ufa, Bashkir ASSR.
(2) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, at Tashkent, Uzbek SSR.
(3) The Spiritual Directorate of the Sunni Moslems of the North Caucasus, at Bunaisk, Dagestan ASSR.
(4) The Spiritual Directorate of the Shia Moslems and the Moslems of all Transcaucasia, at Baku, Azerbaijan SSR.

The second of the spiritual directorates listed governs the religious community of Islamic Central Asia; its territory comprises Uzbekistan, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Tadzhikistan. Its mufti, who ranks together with the three other regional Moslem chiefs directly under the Grand Mufti in Ufa, is Ishan Babakhan, and Uzbek; the second in command in Soviet Central Asia, directly under Mufti Ishan, is the Kadi Abdulgaffar Shemsuddinov, a Kazakh.[2]

The Moslem Administration of the Soviet Union has convoked a series of congresses whose timing is of great interest. A congress of all Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union was convened under the chairmanship

[1] Bennigsen (11), 1952, pp. 12-13.
[2] L'*Oriente Moderno* (87), 1949, p. 11; *Islamic Review* (69), April 1949, pp. 50-51.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2

of Grand Mufti Abderrahman Rasulayev in June 1942; it called upon the world of Islam to cooperate in the defeat of Nazism.[1] The most recent of the congresses was convoked in May 1952 to denounce American agression in Korea.[2]

The policy of expediency and opportunism which has motivated the Soviet manipulation of the Islamic peoples within its borders need not be discussed here. Activities of the Islamic hierarchy have been permitted and supported only when they have served the interests of the Soviet regime. Of greater significance is the error of hyperorganization into which the Soviet regime has fallen. It has in effect perpetuated the error of the Tsarist regime, exposed by Grigoriev, with regard to the Kazakhs and the Kirgiz. Congresses are convoked by rubber stamp to denounce that which Moscow denounces. And the membership and representation of these congresses are augmented by rubber stamp to lend the force of greater numbers to their resolutions. Thus age-old errors are carried forward into the second half of the 20th century.

In summary, then, the religion of the Kazakhs is an amalgam of aboriginal shamanism with certain borrowings from Islam among the folk cults. Since Islam in Central Asia is the religion of the sedentary farmers and the urban societies, the Kazakhs have not had very much direct contact with it, except perhaps for those among the ruling strata of Kazakh khans and sultans. Both the Tsarist and the Soviet regimes have mistakenly grouped the Kazakh nomads in the general category of Central Asiatic Moslems. Although this administrative policy may eventually result in the full incorporation of the Kazakhs into the Islamic world of Central Asia, such is far from the case today. The Pan-Islam movement, working toward the unification of all Islamic peoples, has had small visible effect on the Kazakhs. Interviews conducted in Paris, Munich, and Istanbul among Kazakh DP's point clearly to the lack of contact between the Kazakh herdsmen and Islamic influences in the 1940's. The Soviet regime sometimes adds the denunciation of "Pan-Islamicist" in the round of attack on a political heretic, but it does so by mechanical rote, drawing upon the general armament of the propagandist and the agitator. Rarely is a specific charge made against a Kazakh deviationist; never does the Kazakh press consider it necessary to root out the ideology of Pan-Islam among Kazakhs, although such is frequently the Soviet attitude toward other peoples of Soviet Central Asia.

NATIVISM

Nativism, as a religious development among people who have felt the impact of western civilization, has begun to receive considerable attention in recent anthropological literature.[3] In many parts of the world, natives have reacted to contact with the western culture by rejecting it

[1] *Syria* (83), 23 Jan 42; *L'Oriente Moderno* (87), 1942, p. 372.
[2] *Bennigsen* (11), 1952.
[3] One of the sharpest formulators and most extensive contributors to the theory was the late Ralph Linton.

Kazakhs in one horde under one political government had not been realized since the 15th century, except for a brief adventure in unification by Khan Tiavka at the end of the 17th century.

The term Alash recalls even more ancient days, for it refers to the mythical founder of all Kazakhdom, the ancestor of all Kazakhs, Alash, or Alach. The figure of Alash is not a fiction; he lived in the era of the emperor Tamerlane, near the end of the 14th century. According to the tale recorded in the 19th century of the origin of the Kazakh people, the descendants of Alash divided into three hordes, which in turn formed the basis for the social organization which existed on the eve of the Russian conquest.[1] "Alash" became first a Kazakh battle cry, evoking the name of their glorious ancestry, and finally the name of their first political party.

During the 1920's those leaders of the Alash-Orda who were not purged were gradually absorbed into the Soviet Party and civil life; some of them, Tynyshpaev, Baitursunov, and Bukeikhanov, became active journalists and scholars under the Soviets. They continued to "glorify" the Kazakh past, and were roundly denounced for this by Soviet propagandists. The issue which aroused Soviet disapproval was their representation of the Kazakh community as a sort of idyllic, primitive communism, in which each man helped his neighbor, rich and poor sharing alike. This doctrine was inacceptable to the Soviets of the 1930's, for the line had now become that the Kazakh village was torn with class strife between exploiter and exploited. In the course of this controversy, the old Alash-Orda leaders were purged and liquidated, in a severe struggle which was still going on as late as 1934.[2]

There were companion movements to the Alash-Ordists of Kazakhstan among other people of Central Asia. At the time of the Russian Revolution the political development among the Turks of southern Turkestan and the Caucasus bore the name of Basmachi, while that among the Turks of the southern Urals was known as the Bashkurd (the Bashkir name for themselves); among the Tartars of the Volga region the movement was called the Idil-Ural (Idil or Itil or Idel is an old Turkic name for the Volga River), and a similar movement in Uzbekistan and neighboring areas was known as the Djadid. Some of these movements were markedly and avowedly oriented toward foreign sources.

The Basmachi, for example, geographically close to Turkey, had a strong pro-Turkish orientation, or rather, it endorsed Pan-Turanianism more strongly than the other movements, and this brought it closer to the Turks of Turkey. The Pan-Turanian movement advocates the political unification of all Turks under one state and government, which would stretch from China to European Turkey and the Balkans; it involves open propaganda for separation of Turkestan from Russia. This doctrine is therefore a sensitive subject in Moscow, and the cause of some tension. It was and is a far more dangerous threat than was the Alash-Orda; the strongest Soviet denunciation of the Alash-Ordists is that they were connected with Pan-Turanianism through the Basmachi. Actually, there

[1] Valikhanov, 1904, pp. 289-300.
[2] For a summary, see Togzhanov, 1934, passim.

648 668 is little evidence of contact between the Alash-Orda and the Basmachi, at least at the beginning of the 1920's. But of late the various movements have become combined in the minds of the survivors, and this integration is attributed by them to the past of 30 years ago. Among the most active in this connection is Zeki Walidi Togan, a Turkic historian, now in Turkey, and once a leader in these movements.

The Kazakh revivalists were actively sought out and suppressed by the Soviet regime in the late twenties and early thirties. However, when the USSR was attacked by Germany, Moscow sought to use all tactics at its disposal to encourage the peoples in the Soviet Union to resist Hitler. One such tactic was the encouragement of local cultural traditions among the various peoples, the creation of a native pride which they might fight to preserve. The Kazakhs were encouraged to develop their own history, with the sole proviso that the Soviet era be depicted as the culminating point in their development. This policy was related to the previously cited theory which viewed Tsarism as the lesser evil to Turkestan's being swallowed up by the English, the Germans, or the Chinese. The Soviet policy during World War II produced a great revival of Kazakh in-group feeling, centered around the glorification of Kazakh heroes of the past. Since the Kazakhs had developed their own historical studies [819] during the past century, a process which was accelerated in the Soviet period, the movement to popularize Kazakh heroes and their deeds was turned over to the historians.

Khan Kenesary Kasymov was much written about, discussed, and praised; his name became a popular byword among the Kazakhs in the 1940's, after a century of oblivion. One Kazakh historian, Gabidullah Bekmakhanov, wrote a full-length history of Kenesary's activities against the Russians; this work, prepared as a doctoral dissertation in 1943, was published in 1947 in Alma-Ata. An official history of Kazakhstan written by Abdykalykov, a Kazakh, and the nominal co-author Pankratova (who since has become president of the Historical Section of the All-Union Academy of Sciences) likewise assigned a great and positive historical role to Kenesary. Other pronouncements of the period were less temperate; Sharipov, a Kazakh historian writing in 1949, pictured Kenesary as the prime national liberator. Two professors of history, Ismailov and Djumaliev, took the same line, the latter in a history book written for Kazakh school children.

The movement sought other heroes in the Kazakh past, especially those who had been active against the Russians: Batyr Srym was presented as a heroic figure by his official biographer, Viatkin; the historical significance of Isatai Taimanov, a rebel or liberator of the middle of the 19th century, was advanced by one Shakhmatov; an obscure figure who led a revolt among the Kazakhs of the Syr-Darya against the Russians, Batyr Djankhodji Nurmuhammed, was described by T. Shoinbaev.

The historical tradition which developed was clearly Kazakh, the result of the Kazakhs' search for a native expression of their own, the recreation of a tradition which had lain dormant for several decades.

668 Kazakh nativism as a broad movement with a politico-religious orientation has taken the form of a many-faceted cultural revival. The

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

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The figures for the number of sheep are particularly significant, since this animal is of central importance to the nomad. Mutton is virtually the nomad's only meat; sheep milk is used as much as cow or mare milk. The sheep herds did not recover from the losses of the early 1930's as well as the cattle; by 1949, the number of sheep was 15,000,000, or approximately 68 per cent of the 1929 peak. In 1953, according to a statement made by Khrushchev,[1] secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the number of sheep and goats was significantly less than it had been in 1928, the index year for current Soviet statistics on Kazakh livestock. In 1928, the number of sheep and goats had been 20,500,000, with a ratio of four sheep to one goat; hence there were approximately 16,000,000 sheep. It would appear, then, that the number of sheep has not increased since 1949; it may possibly have decreased.

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[167]

The figures reported for the number of hogs in Kazakhstan provide a useful index of the degree to which Slavic farmers (Russian and Ukrainian) have moved into the republic. The pig is of European origin; it is not native to rural Turkestan and was introduced there only recently. There were 300,000 hogs in Kazakhstan in 1924 and 1929, 500,000 in 1927, and 370,000 in 1938—the only category in which a figure for the 1930's exceeds any of those for the previous decade. Kazakhs have never eaten pork, partly on religious grounds—it is taboo for Moslems—and partly on traditional grounds. The present-day importance of pork in the KSSR economy is shown by the fact that in 1953 it constituted 53 per cent of the total meat production of the republic.[2]

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[262]
[179]

COLLECTIVIZATION

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Of fundamental importance in understanding the Kazakh attitudes toward Sovietization is the impact which collectivization during the late twenties and early thirties had upon these attitudes. During the drive to collectivize the Kazakhs, thousands of families were handed over to the GPU, hundreds of thousands of families starved to death, and further thousands sought to escape the consequences of being identified as Kazakhs by emigrating or declaring themselves to be Uzbeks, Karakalpaks, or other neighboring peoples. (See Chapter 2.)

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[167]

During the period of collectivization, the Party leader of the Kazakh republic, F. I. Goloshchekin, made a number of remarkably frank statements. In a series of articles and speeches prepared between 1928 and 1930, he described how collectivization was accomplished. In November 1928, he stated that 657 households were confiscated, and a total of 143,000 cattle units (whereby five sheep equals one head of cattle) were collectivized.[3] In an article two years later he said that a group of 696 households had been confiscated.[4] Another source reveals that some 700 Kazakh households were confiscated in 1929.[5]

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 23 Oct 53.
[2] *Ibid.*, 21 Oct 53.
[3] Goloshchekin, 1981, p. 201.
[4] *Ibid.*, p. 208.
[5] Kuchkin, 1946.

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The collectivization drive in the 1928-1930 period did not simply confiscate Kazakh households at the rate of 700 a year. In yet another article written during the same period, Goloshchekin summarized the methods used: "Now referring to some of the results of the confiscation, let us look at the methods we used to resolve the question. No doubt the decree [in reconfiscation] was effective here, administrative organs were effective, especially the GPU."[1] If the average per household was no more than five persons, which is a low estimate, there is direct evidence for concluding that in these three years the fates of 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs were placed in the hands of the GPU.

Direct evidence stops at this point. One may infer that these people were lost to the Kazakhs, that even if they were not liquidated, they disappeared in the GPU system. One must bear in mind that these are cases which entered into the official record; it is known that a large proportion of cases turned over to the GPU did not become a matter of record. With the year 1930, the era of frankness came to an end. GPU methods intensified, and the period of the mass purge trials began. Trends which had begun in Kazakh family economy now accelerated until the number of livestock began to fall, between 1929 and 1933. The [031] first reports of confiscations and liquidations are given for 1928; the number of livestock fell by three to five million, or about 10 per cent, from the 38,000,000 reported in 1927. In the spring of 1929 there was a recovery to 40,000,000 head of livestock, but from that point the decline was unbroken, to 33,000,000 in 1930, down to 5,000,000 in 1933.

Thus the second phase of the drive to collectivization was immeasurably worse in its human consequences than the initial phase. The first phase was relatively mild, with the arrest of only a few thousand families. The second phase involved an ever-widening circle of resistance to collectivization by the Kazakhs, punishment by the GPU, increased resistance by the Kazakhs, increased activity by the GPU. This struggle is reflected in the livestock picture, for the Kazakhs continued to care for their stock, even in the face of the mass arrests. With increased terror came increased resistance, as the livestock decline reveals. One can safely estimate that liquidations by the GPU during the second phase were many times those of the first phase, which involved 10,000 to 12,000 Kazakhs at the very least.

This period of mass collectivization was accompanied by the elaboration of what Naum Jasny has called "bacchanalian planning," one of the [311] projects being the fertilization of that cruel steppe desert, the Bet-Pak-Dala. In the following decade, the error of investing in agriculture in the Bet-Pak-Dala was finally seen, and its return to use as a marginal herding zone was recommended.[2] The Soviet ecologists and planners had been overly influenced by the number of natural wells and springs in the Bet-Pak-Dala, calculating their utility to agriculture without reference to the water table or to the poverty of the soil in organic matter. The significance of this error during collectivization was that Kazakhs were settled down precisely in these and other such experimental areas.

[1]Goloshchekin, 1931, p. 206.
[2]Barabin 1946, pp. 116-135.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

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The Kazakhs were collectivized more slowly than the Slavs. By 1930, the Pavlodar region, a Slavic farming area since the 19th century, was 76 per cent collectivized while the Guryev region, a Kazakh pastoral region, was only 44 per cent collectivized.[1] Progress on collectivization was slow both because Kazakh herders were among the strongest resisters to collectivization, and because their nomadic existance made the administrative problems in collectivizing them more difficult than for sedentary peoples.

Another indication of the severity of the impact of collectivization on the Kazakhs is seen in the rate of recovery. During the period including World War I, the Revolution, and the civil war, the Kazakhs suffered a number of heavy blows. They had their own revolution in 1916, which resulted in severe reprisals by the Tsarist enforcement agencies, and during 1917-1922 they suffered losses again. But during the 1920's they recovered to a point where the stock total exceeded that of 1917. Such was not the case in the period following collectivization, however; in 1953 the entire herding economy of Kazakhstan had not reached the position which it had attained in any one of the years in the 1927-1930 period. The Kazakhs in the 1920's demonstrated a resiliency and capacity to meet and overcome disasters, a capacity which is part of their very history as herders. Herding is an economy which has few shock absorbers; herders may easily be wiped out by a drought, a blizzard, or disease among their animals. Farmers have an ability to store against future need which the herders do not.

K [131]

The Kazakhs showed this resiliency during the first years of the Soviet era, in recovering from the civil war. But they have not recovered, even after 25 years, from collectivization. This loss of capacity to recover in the face of disasters is one indication of the collapse of the traditional Kazakh economy, and is related to a breakdown in the traditional form of the Kazakh society and culture.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN THE RURAL ECONOMY

KN 433

In 1952 and 1953, the leadership of the Kazakh Communist Party and of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union made a series of statements indicating the grave situation in farming and herding in the republic.

It has already been stated that of three million hectares of land under irrigation, only 1,300,000 hectares, or 43 per cent, were actually in use. Afonov, until recently the second secretary of the Central Committee of the Kazakh Party, attacked this situation in 1953 as a gross waste of resources.[2] In 1952, the same general criticism had been made in a somewhat different form. The then secretary of the Central Committee, and boss of the Kazakh Party, Shaiakhmetov, attacked the farmers of the southern regions of Kazakhstan, the Uzbeks, Taranchis, Dungans, and others, in Alma-Ata, Taldy-Kurgan, and Dzhambul, the leading agricultural regions of the republic. The principal charge

[1] Golovchenko, 1951, p. 211.
[2] Afonov, *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 8 Oct 53.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
Kazakhstan RQ1

the only means by which, in the present context, the literary, artistic, and scientific expressions of Kazakh culture can develop. Kazakh economic life and material culture today are best described as reflecting a certain dispiritedness. This dispirited attitude underlies the apathy which allows skilled herdsmen to let their herds fall apart—failing to ensure that cows continue to calve, neglecting to shear their sheep, not bringing mares to foal.

These various facts bespeak an unwillingness on the Kazakhs' part to participate in the Soviet life as well as a holding-off policy by Moscow. In the field of native handicrafts a similar situation prevails. Kazakh craftsmen had until recently a degree of skill in rugmaking and felt-making (largely a woman's occupation), leatherwork, and certain metal crafts such as brassworking. These crafts they shared with other Central Asiatic peoples, both Turkic and Iranian. This has all disappeared. The Kazakhs have lost contact with their own culture; they have been forbidden to express interest in their own past.

The Kazakhs recovered splendidly from the losses of World War I and the Revolution, rebuilding their herding strength in the next decade. During this period they were left more or less alone by Moscow. During *1929–1933 the Kazakhs again* suffered tremendous losses. In the ensuing period they were not left alone, and they have not recovered, even after 25 years. Never in the history of Soviet Kazakhstan has a plan for herding been fulfilled. In 1952 a partial exception did occur—the plan for horses was fulfilled—but only, according to Shaiakhmetov, through huge investments by the state.[1]

INDUSTRY

The industrial development of Kazakhstan has proceeded along the line of extraction of natural resources, primarily metals and fuels (see Figure 2). The metal extraction has a history which precedes the Revolution, and is almost exclusively in the field of nonferrous metals; to this day there is very little iron mining and ferrous industry in Kazakhstan.

The chief nonferrous metals are lead and zinc, mined in the Altai Mountains and near Taldy-Kurgan; copper, mined north of Lake Balkhash, in the vicinity of Dzhezkazgan, and between Akmolinsk and Pavlodar; and various deposits of manganese, bauxite, nickel, gold, phosphorus, chromite, and mineral salts. Iron is mined near the Sary-Su and at Kustanay.

Kazakhstan has both solid and liquid fuel resources. Large deposits of coal are scattered throughout the central and northern parts of the republic, from the Mangyshlak peninsula in the west to the Chinese border in the east; the most important, ranking third in the Soviet Union, is that at Karaganda. Lignite is found in the extreme south, at Lenger and Chimkent, but in small amounts relative to the solid fuels in the republic. Oil is found along the Caspian shore near the port of Guryev, and in the steppe between the Emba and Ural rivers.[2]

[1] *Ibid.*, 21 Sep 53.
[2] Pal'gov, 1953, pp. 126-135.

KN 665 642

Committee. Since that time, Party and government have been publicly associated and closely allied in personnel, operation, and performance.

GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION OF KAZAKHSTAN

KN 63 [647]

The administrative structure of Kazakhstan[1] is at present identical to that in other soviet socialist republics in the USSR, and for that reason no detailed description of the structure itself will be given here. (See Figure 5.) There have, however, been a number of changes in the administrative organization of the republic in the past, and these will be briefly noted.

In 1925 there were 6 regions, 2 circuits, and 123 districts. The district (raion) was first formed in 1924 and may be regarded as a "miniature region" whose boundaries are determined primarily by economic factors. During the 1920's a transition took place from territorial to economic divisions. The last province (gubernia) was abolished in 1930, and in the same year the circuit (okrug) went almost completely out of existence. With its disappearance, the districts became directly subordinated to the regions. Autonomous republics were under the direct jurisdiction of a union republic; Kazakhstan was such an autonomous unit until 1936, forming part of the RSFSR.

Each district is administratively subdivided into village, aul, collective farm, and other soviets (councils). *Cities and other settlements* of an urban nature form another part of the administrative structure. Usually they are directly subordinated to a district, but large and economically important cities come under direct regional or republic jurisdiction.

By 1936 Kazakhstan had nine regions (oblasts). In 1949 the territorial subdivision of Kazakhstan looked like this: 16 regions; 36 cities (the capital, Alma-Ata, of republic jurisdiction, 20 cities of regional jurisdiction, 15 cities of district jurisdiction); 203 rural districts; 9 municipal wards; 2,674 rural (village or aul) soviets; 115 settlements of city type.[2]

KN [162] K [160]

In 1928, out of a total of 3,888 village-aul soviets, 2,199 were Kazakh, 1,209 Russo-Ukrainian, and 115 Russo-Cossack; 140 were "mixed," and there were 225 soviets of unenumerated minor nationalities.[3] By 1931 the total village-aul soviets numbered 3,763; of these, 2,169 were Kazakh, 1,470 "others," and 124 "mixed."[4] No ethnic breakdown is available for the 1949 figure of 2,674 village-aul soviets. Of the 182 districts listed in 1930, 112 were Kazakh;[5] for 1949 no ethnic breakdown exists.

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Some information is available on the nationality and social composition among the Supreme Soviet representation. At the 1947 Soviet Congress the 300 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the KSSR included

[1] See *Constitution of the Kazakh SSR*, as amended through 1951.
[2] SSSR, *Administrativno-Territorial'noe Delenie Soiuznykh Respublik*, May 1949, pp. 273-295.
[3] *TsIK, Materialy k Otchetu . . .*, 1928.
[4] *Ves' Kazakhstan*, 1931.
[5] *Revoliutsiia i Natsional'nosti*, No. 6, 1930, p. 14.

168 Kazakhs, 88 Russians, 33 Ukrainians, and 11 "others." More than two-thirds of the deputies (232) were either candidates or members of the Party. Approximately one-third of the deputies were workers, one-third peasants, and one-third "employees and others."[1]

According to official sources, participation in elections approaches 100 per cent of eligible voters: the latest report claims 3,046,109 eligible voters for Kazakhstan in 1951, of whom 99.99 per cent voted.[2]

The collectivization drive and the various purges greatly influenced the soviet organization of Kazakhstan during the 1930's. The movement to replace Russian personnel by qualified Kazakhs failed for want of trained Kazakh cadres. The Russians in responsible government posts encountered uncooperative natives. There were too many plans, too little fulfillment. "Great power" chauvinism survived, with the Russians in Kazakhstan looking upon the natives as an "odd assortment" and considering them a bothersome "overhead." Undeniably, there were few qualified personnel to be recruited from among the Kazakhs. Those who did enter government service were treated as inferiors by the entrenched Russians.

These conditions forced the Kazakh Central Executive Committee (TsIK) to plan a thorough improvement in the situation, at the same time that the political and administrative units were being reorganized along economic-production lines. Kazakhstan was one of the five autonomous republics in which the soviet apparatus for districts had to be completely revamped to replace the old tsarist territorial unit, the rural district (Uezd').

The planned reorganization of Kazakh administration ran into many difficulties, caused in large part by poor personnel and primitive communication conditions. In 1930, for example, 82 districts had no radio, telegraph, or telephone connections with the center of the republic.[3] The official language was Russian, yet the reorganization was primarily concerned with districts which were predominantly Kazakh.

Just when the organizational level appeared to be catching up with the demands of the area, there was a further expansion of the bureaucratic machinery of government. Today the councils at the various levels of government employ virtually an army of public officials who need continuous training to carry out their work. The integration of Kazakhs into the apparatus has never been achieved satisfactorily, and feminine participation in governmental affairs on the local and central levels is still woefully inadequate.

The Party constantly directs its attention toward shortcomings of Kazakh governmental departments. Attacks are made on the Council of Ministers, on the planning agencies of the republic, and on the general central governmental hierarchy for its lack of sensitivity to local conditions and for the manifestation of a "formalistic" attitude toward its obligations.[4] When there were serious shortcomings in agriculture, the

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 20 Mar 47.
[2] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (36), III, pp. 8, 24.
[3] *Revolutsiia i Natsional'nosti*, No. 7, 1930, p. 46.
[4] *Pravda*, 2 Mar 49.

KN 692 [685]

for the USSR as a whole.[1] Various sources indicate, however, that the Prosecutor and the various courts in Kazakhstan have been kept extremely busy with cases concerned with theft of socialist property, particularly on collective farms. In postwar years the republic press has reported numerous trials involving persons accused of appropriating livestock and food in violation of regulations. The press also carries the usual civil and criminal cases, but it is not surprising to find that the punishment meted out for theft of socialist property, when compared with, for example, that for theft of private property, is disproportionately severe.

This question comes to mind: Are there any known instances when courts treated Kazakh offenders more or less severely than nonnative persons? The dismissal of the Minister of Justice, Nurbaev, was based on his "faulty and unfair" handling of cadre affairs. Could the real charge have been that he did not act forcefully in attacking fellow Kazakhs accused of violating the Agricultural Artel Charter?

KN [562] [563]

The Party has complained repeatedly about the inactivity of the courts and the prosecutors with regard to some basic, recurring problems. These offices were apparently loath to prosecute cases where it had been established that women were kept out of industrial and administrative positions, in violation of existing rules. And, even more seriously, both courts and prosecutors remained inactive regarding the problem of manifestations of cultural and religious "deviations" in certain areas of Kazakhstan.

Some of these phenomena stem from the collision between the long-established Moslem legal conceptions and the relatively recently introduced Soviet legal ideas and needs, a factor related to the religious problems of the area (see Chapter 4).

THE OVERLAPPING LEADERSHIP OF PARTY AND GOVERNMENT

KN 665 647

After a period of organizing and strengthening its position, the Party has achieved actual control over administrative affairs, yet the myth of separation between the political Party and the legislative structure in the Soviet Union still is maintained. At the apex of the hierarchy Stalin, by virtue of his posts as Party Secretary-General and Chairman of the Council of Ministers, united in his person both Party and government leadership. His associates and underlings in Party affairs also functioned in responsible posts in the government.

K [648]

Parallel developments took place in the administrative subdivisions of the Soviet Union. The intertwining of Party and government in the Kazakh Republic can be shown conclusively. Following is a list of the names and positions of various individuals in the KSSR government and Party; in most cases the positions of officeholders and functionaries will be given for the period 1945-1952 (through the Sixth

[1] Constitutional provisions can be found in the *Kazakh Constitution*, Articles 82-87, and in the *USSR Constitution*, Articles 105-109. For additional information, see J. Towster (123), 1948; 1936 USSR Constitution; Constitution of the KSSR; *Novy Zakon o Sudoustroistvo*, 1938.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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Kazakh Party Congress in September 1952).[1] Nationalities have been indicated wherever such information was available or, in its absence, wherever names provide an unequivocal clue.

Afonov, I. I. (Russian). From 1949 on, he functioned as second secretary of the Party, and was a member of the Central Committee bureau and the Central Committee. At the same time, he sat in the Presidium of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet.

Baigaliev, K. B. (Probably Tatar). A Central Committee member since 1951, as well as chief of the Central Committee Fiction and Art Section. He was also chairman of the Cultural Education Committee in the Council of Ministers, and became Minister of Culture in April 1953.

Beisenov, A. B. (Moslem). While chairman of the Council of Professional Unions in Kazakhstan, he was a member of the Party Central Committee from 1949 on.

Byzov, A. P. (Russian). Minister of State Security (MGB) in 1946 and 1947, member of the Central Committee and its bureau from 1946 through 1949.

Daulbaev, A. D. (Karakalpak). A Central Committee bureau candidate in 1949, member of the Central Committee from 1949 on, Commissar for Agriculture (Minister in 1946) from 1945 to 1952, and Minister for Water Resources from 1952.

Desanov, A. (Kazakh). The chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Court from 1947 on. He was a Central Committee candidate from 1949 on.

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[562] *Dospanova, Kh.* (Kazakh). She was a Central Committee bureau member in 1951, and was a member of the Central Committee from 1951 on; also on the Central Committee Revision Commission in 1949. Since 1951, a secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, and from 1951 until 1952, secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Dykhnov, N. V. (Russian). Central Committee candidate in 1951 and Komsomol Central Committee secretary since 1951.

Dzhangozin, D. (Kazakh). First secretary of the Alma-Ata Regional Party Committee in 1945, member of the Party Central Committee since 1949, Supreme Soviet chairman in 1947. Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1951 to 1953, and subsequently Trade Minister.

Ezmagambetova, Sh. (Kazakh). A vice-chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1945, and a Central Committee member since 1949.

Fitin, P. M. (Russian). Member of both Central Committee and bureau since 1951, and Minister for State Security (MGB) from 1952 until the absorption of that Ministry by the Ministry of Internal Affairs in April 1953.

Gabin, V. V. (Russian Jew). Minister for Internal Affairs (MVD) since 1953. He was a Central Committee bureau candidate in 1951, full member of the bureau in 1952, and a member of the Central Committee from 1951 on.

Iakovlev, S. Ia. (Russian). Chief of the Cadre Section, Central Committee in 1945. Member of the Central Committee since 1949, bureau member from 1949 through September 1952, and Party secretary for the same time period. A member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1952.

Ivandaev, I. V. (Russian). Member of the Central Committee from 1949 through 1952. Sovkhoz Minister from February through October 1952.

Kenapin, A. K. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1946, bureau candidate in 1946, and full member from 1949 to 1951. First secretary of the Kazakh Komsomol from 1945, and deputy to the Kazakh Supreme Soviet in 1946.

Koribzhanov, F. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1951, bureau candidate in 1951, and full member in 1952. Chief of the Central Committee Agriculture Section from 1951 to 1953, at which time he became Minister for Agriculture and Procurements.

Kozhakhmetov, G. Sh. (Kazakh). Third secretary of the Party in 1947, Party secretary from 1949 through 1952. Central Committee bureau member from 1947 through 1952, and member of the Central Committee since 1947. Chairman of the Supreme Soviet from 1951 on.

[1] The following section corresponds, as far as nationality classifications are concerned, with an independent study made by Dr. Dmitri Shimkin of The Bureau of the Census (114).

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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Kerimbaev, D. (Kazakh). Central Committee bureau member since 1947; and member of the Central Committee from 1949 on. Chairman of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1947. Vice-chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium in 1948.

Kistanov, A. M. (Kazakh). Central Committee member in 1949, and candidate of the Central Committee since 1951. Vice-chairman of the Council of Peoples' Commissars in 1945. Commissar (Minister since 1946) of Industrial Crops from 1945-47, and Minister of Sovkhos from 1951.

Kruglov, S. I. (Russian). Party Central Committee member and bureau member from 1948 to 1949, also second secretary during same period, but dismissed from post in January 1952 as "protector of bourgeois nationalist perversions." Member of the Supreme Soviet Presidium from 1947 to 1953, when he left Kazakhstan.

Kunaev, D. A. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate in 1949 and 1950, full member since 1951. Vice-chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers from 1947 on. President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences since 1952.

Mambetov, A. I. (Kazakh). Party Central Committee candidate in 1949 and 1952, Central Committee member from 1951 to 1952. Minister for Agriculture from 1952 to 1953 (when Ministry was merged into new body, the Ministry of Agriculture and Procurements). Supreme Soviet Presidium member from date unknown until 1952, then released to take over post of Minister.

Mukanov, S. M. (Kazakh). Central Committee member from 1949 to 1952, chairman of the Presidium of the Kazakh Union of Soviet Writers, 1945 to 1952, and released at the later date because of position in the nationalist controversy.

Neklindov, A. I. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1951, and Secretary of the Supreme Soviet Presidium since 1952.

Nikitin, I. I. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1949, assistant editor of *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda* until 1948, and chief editor since then.

Nurumbaeva, M. S. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers since 1951.

Sembaev, A. I. (Kazakh). Party Central Committee member from 1949 to 1951; since then Central Committee candidate. Commissar (later Minister) for Education through 1945.

Shaiakhmetov, Ak. (Tatar). Central Committee member since 1938. Second secretary from 1939 to 1946, then first secretary until the purge of February 1954. Also a member of the Central Committee Bureau. Member of the All-Union Party Central Committee, and chairman of the USSR Council of Nationalities in 1952. Member of the Kazakh Supreme Soviet Presidium from 1947 on.

Sharipov, I. S. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949. Member of the Kazakh Party Revision Commission in 1949. Vice-chairman of the Sovnarkom (later Council of Ministers) since 1946.

Shaukenbaev, T. Sh. (Kazakh). Central Committee candidate since 1951, became chairman of Kazakh GOSPLAN in 1859.

Taibekov, E. G. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949, member of the Central Committee bureau since 1951, as well as member of the All-Union Party Central Committee. Chairman of the Kazakh Council of Ministers from 1951 on.

Talebaev, T. (Kazakh). Central Committee member since 1949, chief of the Central Committee Planning-Finance-Trade Section from 1949 to 1952, and Minister of Finance since 1951.

Undasynov, N. D. (Kazakh). Central Committee and bureau member from 1949 to 1952. Chairman of the Sovnarkom (later Council of Ministers) until 1951, at which time he was relieved from post for "further studies."

Vlasenko, M. D. (Ukrainian). Central Committee candidate since 1952. Deputy Commissar for Sovkhoz until 1946; from then on, Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Became Minister for Sovkhos late in 1952.

Zagovelev, A. P. Central Committee member from 1949 until 1952, and bureau member until 1951. Vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers through 1947.

Zhukov, L. G. (Russian). Central Committee member since 1952. Chief of the Central Committee Transportation and Communication Section since 1952. Named Minister for Highways and Highway Transportation in 1953.[1]

[1]Dr. N. N. Poppe of the University of Washington, as consultant to the project, gave the research team special assistance in the identification of names.

8:Krader & Wayne E-4 (no date) 1955 RQ2 Kazak RQ2
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Dates prior to 1945 were not stated in this summary of leader activities, as the primary concern was to show the overlapping functions for the period since World War II. The key dates for Kazakh Party Congresses, at which elections and nominations for Party posts were made, were: Fourth Congress, February 1949; Fifth Congress, December 1951; Sixth Congress, September 1952. Membership in the Central Committee bureau and posts in the technical apparatus are listed from the Party Congress at which election or appointment was made through the year in which, in the current Congress, the appointment or election was not repeated, unless evidence is available that the individual has been purged or transferred somewhere along the line.

KAZAKH PARTICIPATION IN MILITARY ACTIVITIES

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Several infantry divisions were organized on Kazakh territory during World War II; of these, the 238th and 316th are mentioned most prominently. Little is known with respect to their nationality composition. On the other hand, it is reported that 60 per cent of all KSSR Communist Party members had joined the Armed Forces; the Komsomol, too, supplied a large contingent.

The two divisions cited were thrown into combat in the defense of Moscow and in the battle for Tula. Their losses were staggering. The 238th Infantry Division was rewarded for heroism by being renamed the 30th Guards Division. The 316th Division, led by General Panfilov, was later designated the 8th Guards Division. In Kazakh sources it is often called the Panfilov division for its leader, who was posthumously awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union"; the few surviving members of the old division are reverently referred to as Panfilovtsy.[1]

Towster[2] gives pertinent information regarding the distribution of Soviet military honors awarded during the period June 1941-October 1944. The title "Hero of the Soviet Union" was awarded to 5,901 soldiers of whom 57 were Kazakhs. Three million soldiers, including 34,000 Kazakhs, received other orders and medals. The Kazakh share of these awards amounted to about one per cent—fewer than, but not too divergent from, the proportion of Kazakhs in the population of the Soviet Union.

Whether the Kazakh nationals in the Red Army had experiences which were radically different from those of their Russian comrades-in-arms cannot be determined with certainty. As one would expect, available Soviet sources provide no indication that Kazakhs were treated as inferiors. The other avenue of information, German documents captured by the United States Army, provides a totally different picture.

Descriptions of interrogations of prisoners of war of Turkestan origin conducted by German investigators appear occasionally within several bulky files held by the Defense Department Records Branch in

[1] That few seem to have survived is illustrated by the fact that at the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of Kazakhstan as a republic, only 28 were reported as having participated in a parade.

[2] Towster (123), 1948, p. 357.

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Alexandria.[1] These materials suffer from the German interviewers' lack of skill as well as from biases and distortions supplied by both the Germans and their prisoners. Contradictions are frequent. The soldiers interviewed were defectors or deserters, and this factor must be kept in mind. Nevertheless, these men provide the only information available on service conditions, and certainly some of their reports may be taken seriously.

Almost every man interviewed voiced the opinion that minorities were treated badly in mixed units, especially in those units where Russian officers and noncommissioned officers predominated. Mutual distrust prevailed in such units; minority nationals were kept under surveillance because it was feared that they might desert. Morale among those nationals was low, especially when mail from home arrived announcing unfair or brutal treatment of the soldiers' families (requisitions, inhuman work loads, and so forth). The consensus of opinion among prisoners who belonged to several different units gives some credence to such reports. Further corroboration is supplied by some Russian soldiers interviewed at the same time. These men spoke of their Central Asian comrades as "poor soldiers" and "illiterates."

Some units formed in Central Asia had been organized rather hurriedly and shipped out with little or no training. It is small wonder, then, that such outfits did not resist German pressure effectively. When they asked about the reason for desertion, the German interrogators elicited most frequently the response that the man in question did not want to fight for the Russians. Nobody admitted fear as a direct motivating factor; a few volunteered the additional information that they resented fighting for a regime which had forced the free nomads into collectives.[2] According to interrogators' comments, virtually all Kazakh PW's spoke little or no Russian. German propaganda achieved a measure of success only after it began using the minority languages.

The racial doctrine of the Nazis tended to reinforce unfavorable comparisons made between the German and the Turkic soldiers, and almost barred the way to mutual understanding. Nevertheless, with the advice of civilian experts and officers who had lived in Turkestan and spoke the languages of the volunteers, the Germans managed to create the militarily satisfactory 162nd Infantry Division composed of Turkic nationals. This division stayed in the Italian campaign to the end of the war. It was forced to retreat hastily under pressure on several occasions, yet the German-Turkic solidarity was so high that desertions to the Allied side were often remarkably low, and no case was reported of Asiatic soldiers killing any of the German cadre although conditions were favorable for such action.

[1] Only a preliminary survey of these materials was made in connection with this study. Although useful information was obtained, it soon became evident that full exploitation of the captured German records for this purpose would far exceed the limitations of time and money established for the present research.

[2] Three Kazakh deserters said that they decided to bolt when they found a German propaganda leaflet telling them (in their native language) that there were no kolkhozes in Germany (October 1942).

which borders the Karakalpak. Similarly, Kirgiz is differentiated from Kazakh by minor sound changes. Within Kazakhstan proper two dialects may be found which derive their respective labels from the way the word for "no" is pronounced: (1) jŏk (dzhok), in the eastern parts of the republic, and (2) zŏk (zhok), in the western and northern parts of Kazakhstan.

These are, however, minor differences. The main point is that for purposes of oral communication Kazakh, Kirgiz, and Karakalpak are so mutually intelligible as to form a single language.

In writing and printing, the Turks of Central Asia used the Arabic script until the 20th century. In the 1930's Soviet authorities introduced first the Latin and in 1939-1940 the Cyrillic alphabets, with certain necessary additions for each language. The resultant orthographies present slightly differing appearances for Kazakh and Kirgiz. This difference constitutes a handicap, even for educated readers, to those unaccustomed to reading printed matter in both languages. Nevertheless, after a little initial hesitation, a Kazakh reader will be able to make out the content of an article in an unfamiliar Kirgiz newspaper. The communicator trying to reach both Kirgiz and Kazakhs by means of a written or printed document in one of these languages should therefore be aware that he must provide some incentive to readers of the other language to expend the extra effort.

In delimiting a target group within the Kazakh SSR one should remember that Slavs (Russians and Ukrainians) constitute over half of the total population. Russian is the language of the politically dominant group; the central government in Moscow is determined to make it the lingua franca of the realm. How much bilingualism this effort has produced among the Kazakhs is not known. Communist Party authorities frequently complain about the inadequacy of Russian instruction in Kazakh SSR schools. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that the proportion of Kazakhs with knowledge of Russian has increased greatly in the last two decades. No quantitative information in this respect is available, but a few generalizations can be made. In general, more Kazakh men than women, and more young people than old, learn the Russian language. One finds proportionately more Russian-speaking Kazakhs in urban areas than in rural (and fewest among the remaining nomadic tribes), and more among those whose socialestatus makes knowledge of Russian a necessity for maintaining that status, such as political and professional leaders and workers in prestige manual occupations such as railroading.

On the other hand, the proportion of Russians in the KSSR who have a good working knowledge of the Kazakh language is probably small. Those who have such knowledge are minor officials, Party functionaries, work foremen, and others who deal with the monolingual Kazakh population in a direct supervisory capacity.

Much more would have to be said about bilingualism in a study of the other four union republics in Soviet Central Asia.[1] The fact that

[1]The Tartars of Turkestan deserve special mention in this context. They owe their important historical position as traders and mediators between the Turks and Russians to their knowledge of languages, high general educational standards (e.g., literacy), and zeal as teachers of Islam. However, it is probable that the influence of this small ethnic group (about 1% in 1926) has declined in the last quarter of a century.

K KN 203

Nevertheless, among primitive peoples news often travels with amazing alacrity. One example of a technologically primitive but effective medium is the "jungle telegraph" of relayed tom-tom beats. The people of the steppe also developed an institution for the rapid transmission of news and rumor: the uzun kulak (the "long ear"). As soon as a given item of news reached an aul, a man mounted his horse and sped to the nearest encampment to inform its inhabitants of imminent danger or the presence of the tax collector. This form of rumor-through-cavalry still achieves some surprising results. During the collectivization drive, it frequently happened that by the time the grain-collecting party arrived in an area, all Kazakhs had disappeared—men, women, children, animals, tents, grain, and all. Soviet sources testify to many instances of the effectiveness of the uzun kulak. In view of its institutionalized character, "the long ear" qualifies for mention as an established means of communication in Kazakhstan. K [648]

KN 208 665

The "long ear" is a peculiarly Kazakh form of communication. Another communication phenomenon of typically Soviet origin is that of mass agitation. Inkeles devotes a goodly part of his book to the topic of agitation and the agitator. From the point of view of the audience (kolkhoz or factory workers, miners, students, or the public at large), the agitators are transmitters of the current Party line regarding theoretical orthodoxy, persuaders who must induce their listeners to fulfill given economic goals. According to official figures 60 per cent of all agitators were KSSR Party members. The rest came mostly from the Komsomol organization.[1] KN [883]

In 1949, there were 12,580 propagandists (of whom only 400 were full-time propaganda workers) and 122,000 agitators in the KSSR;[2] in 1951, the figures reported were 15,810 and 158,652.[3]

A particularly interesting form of agitation is the Red Yurt. The use of Red Yurts in Kazakhstan is comparable to that of Red Tents in other critical Soviet areas. Red Yurts travel across the country, stopping in areas where the Party wants to intensify its drive for bigger and better production. In 1948, for example, a Red Yurt was set up in Western Kazakhstan; it served the livestock breeders of a large collective. Among them it organized 300 veterinary, literary, agitation brigade, and dramatic circles. Its library contained more than 500 books on art, politics, and technical subjects.[4]

KN [182]

The activities of the Red Yurt illustrate a major truth about the Soviet Union: It is extremely difficult to delineate within any area of the Soviet Union what falls under the heading of communication, or agitation and propaganda, or perhaps information and education.

[1] *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, 25 Feb 49.
[2] *Ibid.*
[3] *Ibid.*, 16 Dec 51.
[4] *Kul'turno-Prosvetitel'naia Rabota*, Vol. 13, No. 7, July 1953, p. 47.

RP2 Kirgiz RP2

Kazak RQ2

Ki 177 the valley of the Tekes and to throw these lands open for Russian colonisation. An autonomous "territory of the Ḳarā Ḳirghiz" or Ḳirghizistān has now been constituted with Pishpek as capital (the term "Ḳarā" was never adopted by the people themselves and is now definitely repudiated).

Ka 101 Until recently in both Russia and Western Europe the name "Kirgiz" meant particularly the Ḳazāḳ; they are sometimes called also "Kirgiz-Kaisak" (Kaisak, corrupted from Kazak, to distinguish them from the Russian Cossacks). On the Ka 175 separation of the Ḳazāḳ from the Özbeg, cf. the articles ABU 'L-KHAIR and ḲAZĀḲ. The whole of the Ḳazāḳ people was for long under the rule of one Ḵhān who therefore had a considerable military force at his disposal; Ḵhān Ḳāsim (d. 924 = 1518) was particularly powerful. In spite of several defeats from the Mongols allied with the Özbegs in the xvi^th century, the Ḳazāḳ still had a strong nomad kingdom at the end of this century under the rule of Ḵhān Tawakkul, who, during the last years of the reign of Ḵhān ʿAbd Allāh b. Iskandar [q. v.], was able to make a successful incursion into Mā warā al-Nahr and even later still held the town of Tāshkent. In the xvii^th century the power of the Ḵhāns only rarely extended over the whole people; but about this time Tāshkent and Farghāna were usually in the possession of the Ḳazāḳ, sometimes under nominal recognition of Ka the suzerainty of the Ḵhāns of the Özbegs. At [631] this time must have taken place the division of the Ḳazāḳ into three "Hordes" (called by the Ḳazāḳ themselves *djüz* "hundred"); the great horde (*uluˇ djüz*) occupied the most easterly, the little (*kiˇichi djüz*) the most westerly part of the so-called "Kirgiz steppes" and between the two the central horde (*orta djüz*). Towards the end of the xvii^th century this division was already an accomplished fact. Ḵhān Tyawka, celebrated as the law-giver of his people (in 1694 a Russian embassy was received by him in the town of Turkistān and in 1698 one from the Kalmucks), still ruled all three Hordes and had a representative in each of them. In 1717 unsuccessful negotiations for the submission of all three Hordes to Peter the Great were conducted; in 1723 the towns of Sairām, Tāshkent and Turkistān were conquered by the Kalmucks. For a short period after this the suzerainty of the Ḵhān of the Little Horde was recognised by all the Ḳazāḳ and the agreement Ka doing this was sealed by the sacrifice of a white ● [648] horse but the treaty had no practical results. In 1730, Abu 'l-Ḵhair negotiated with Russia and concluded a treaty by which he declared himself and his people Russian subjects. This treaty was renewed several times in the xviii^th century; but it was not till the xix^th century, especially after 1847, when the Russians were firmly established on the southern frontier of the Kirgiz steppes on the Sir Daryā, that Russian rule became definitely established over the steppes and their inhabitants. Ka The eastern part of the steppes was administered 177 from Siberia and the western from Orenburg; re- [565] gulations for the government of the Siberian Ḳazāḳ were published in 1822 and again in 1868. Even after the abolition of the Ḵhān's authority, the descendants of Čingiz Ḵhān or "Sulṭāns" exercised a considerable influence over the people as a nobility (among the Ḳazāḳ called "white bones", *aḳ süyek*); their authority has been gradually destroyed by the measures of the Russian Government. The last

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